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Abstract
Since their inception at the end of the Second World War, the sister organizations of the World Bank and the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) have aimed to consistently speak with one voice vis-à-vis their member govern-
ments. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that they often do not speak in one voice. Fabricius draws on ﬁeld
research conducted in Ghana, Pakistan, Peru, and Vietnam to identify the conditions that determine whether or
not the organizations are indeed on the same page and to address whether their traditional plea for consistency is
always desirable. He recommends which measures seem crucial to ensure Bank-Fund consistency. At the same time
he argues that under certain conditions, this consistency may lead to policy choices that are only second-best. He
proposes that the Bank and the Fund pursue a case-speciﬁc approach in deciding whether they should take the
same stance. A more ﬂexible approach may increase not only the ownership of borrowing countries but also the
sustainability of policy choices.
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INTRODUCTION
An important debate has emerged about how the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) can salvage their legitimacy and enhance their eﬀectiveness as managers of the global ﬁnancial 
architecture. Much of the reform debate focuses on improving accountability and governance within 
each organization.1 Underlying much of the discussion and corresponding proposals for reform (though 
not always explicitly) is the complicated nature of the relationship between the two Bretton Woods 
sisters; at times they resemble rivaling siblings, other times close conﬁdants. While the Fund and the 
Bank were established at Bretton Woods to complement one another in promoting economic stability 
and growth, their mandates have shifted and expanded over the years in response to changing realities of 
the global economy. The result is greater overlap of Fund and Bank activities which, some have argued, 
has contributed to greater room for conﬂict.2 As a result, increasing attention has been paid, particularly 
over the last decade, to ensure that the cooperation between the two organizations runs smoothly and 
consistently. However, results of such eﬀorts have been mixed. As Edwin Truman has described, “despite 
frequent protestations to the contrary from the leadership of the two organizations, it is widely believed 
that turf battles are frequent and cooperation and coordination fall short of what a rational person would 
view as desirable” (Truman 2006a, 65). 
So why all the problems? Why can’t the sisters just get along? The answer is that we don’t really 
know, at least not empirically. Despite a series of agreements (and periodic reviews of those agreements) 
aimed at strengthening Bank-Fund cooperation, little empirical evidence exists about how and under what 
circumstances the two organizations work together. In other words, the current discussion about how to 
improve Bank-Fund cooperation ignores the fact that the record is not clear about which factors inhibit or 
encourage better cooperation between the two. The underlying assumption is that the Bank and the Fund 
should speak with one voice to avoid inconsistencies in policy advice to borrowing countries. As stated in 
the 1989 Concordat agreement between the Bank and the Fund on collaboration, “[e]xisting procedures 
and practices of Bank-Fund collaboration are designed to ensure the quality of analysis and policy advice, 
as well as thorough explorations of any diﬀerences of view that may emerge between the staﬀs” (IMF 1989, 
paragraph 17). Yet, when inconsistencies do happen, existing academic literature and published reports on 
the matter fall short of explaining why. At the same time, it is not apparent that consistency (i.e., agreement 
between the Bank and Fund) in and of itself leads to the best policy recommendations, particularly in light 
of shifting priorities in the policy-lending environment.3
1. The term “organization” is used here and throughout the paper when referring to the IMF and the World Bank to reﬂect the 
importance of aspects of organizational analysis and operational matters in the discussion. The term “organization” helps avoid 
confusion with the term “institution” as it is used in the context of “institution building” and relating to economic institutions in 
speciﬁc economies, in particular the economies of recipient countries.
2. For example, Ngaire Woods (2006, 176) argues that, “[t]he new debt relief initiative has brought the Fund and the Bank into 
greater areas of potential conﬂict with one another. As had occurred before, the respective roles of the IMF and World Bank had 
to be very carefully negotiated and elaborated.” 
3. Referring to consistency, one terminological note is in order: As explained in more detail in section 1, this work deﬁnes 
cooperation between the Bank and the Fund in terms of consistency of the stances they take vis-à-vis third parties, i.e., 4
Key to the issue of Bank-Fund cooperation is the fact that pronouncements and concordats may 
be missing a key point. Cooperation and consistency between the Bank and Fund is an operational 
matter. Therefore, forces and trends that aﬀect the way the two organizations operate will inﬂuence 
how they work together. Despite many similarities, the two organizations diﬀer greatly on multiple 
aspects like organizational structures, styles, and momentum, all which inﬂuence their operations and 
can undermine eﬀorts to ensure consistency. 
Another key issue is that the perennial discussion of how to strengthen the division of labor 
between the Bank and the Fund does not seem to have evolved with the changing context of policy-
based lending. Though the two organizations provide other services to member governments besides 
ﬁnancial assistance (e.g., technical assistance and statistical analysis), lending has typically been the 
most prominent service generating the most intense interaction between states and the Bretton Woods 
organizations. Shifting roles and responsibilities between the two organizations and new priorities for 
successful lending mean that more extreme measures may be in order for determining how the Bank 
and the Fund divvy up their lending activities. As will be discussed in section IV, there is a case for 
signiﬁcant scaling back of IMF operations to focus on core macroeconomic policy variables with the 
Bank assuming the bulk of policy-lending operations on matters more closely related to development. 
Against this backdrop, this paper presents the ﬁndings of an empirical study whose principal aim 
is to explain the variation in Bank-Fund consistency. By observing a series of variables over a sample 
of policy-lending arrangements in four countries, the study sheds light on when the Bank and Fund 
have been found to adopt consistent stances vis-à-vis the borrowing government. The analysis clariﬁes 
the speciﬁc variables which explain that variation. The discussion in subsequent sections relates the 
evidence from the study to the mechanisms and arrangements employed over the years to ensure Bank-
Fund consistency. Finally, in light of the increasing emphasis placed on ownership and country-speciﬁc 
knowledge as keys to successful policy-based lending operations, section IV questions whether Bank-Fund 
consistency is even as relevant as it once was. The discussion oﬀers two concrete proposals for altering the 
operations of the organizations to generate more sound policy recommendations for borrowing countries. 
Changing Roles and Changing Times
Before going into more detail about the country evidence, some general remarks on the context of Bank-
Fund cooperation are in order. The current debate over IMF and World Bank reform was triggered by 
controversies that arose primarily during the 1990s surrounding currency crises and large scale bailouts 
by the Bretton Woods sisters. Suspicion of errors in the organizations’ policy advice to these countries, 
particularly in relation to the so called Asian Crisis, raised serious questions as to both the importance 
and the eﬀectiveness of subsidized lending provided by multilateral development banks. Emerging from 
these experiences was a sense that the Bretton Woods organizations had fallen short of performing the 
governments of borrowing countries and other donors. Hence, if the Bank and the Fund are found to take consistent stances vis-
à-vis third parties, they are said to cooperate. Correspondingly, if their stances are found to be inconsistent, they are considered as 
not cooperating.5
functions international public bodies should carry out in the international economic arena. Furthermore, 
the rather public disagreements between the Fund and the Bank forced the organizations to rethink and 
recommit to the long-held vision of consistency. 
Although agreements on cooperation between the two organizations date back to 1966, the 
1989 Concordat was the most explicit in underscoring the importance of Bank-Fund collaboration 
in terms of “serving member governments with maximum eﬀectiveness in meeting their development 
needs and in providing support for macroeconomic and structural change” and, particularly, to avoid 
having the two organizations give diﬀerent policy advice (IMF 1989, paragraph 2). What diﬀered 
in the case of the Concordat was the context. During the 1980s, the Fund’s lending became more 
concessional, further related to sectoral and structural matters and increasingly focused on lower 
income countries, namely those typically served by the Bank. As activities of the two became more 
and more intertwined, the response of the organizations’ management seemed to entail more forceful 
restatements of each organization’s core responsibilities.4
At the same time that the mandates of the two organizations were evolving, bringing them 
into greater overlap and potential conﬂict, the very environment of policy lending began to shift. 
Traditionally, the Bank and the Fund adhered to certain recipes for reform and prescribed many 
conditions of their policy lending accordingly. However, as Center for Global Development working 
group cochairs Nancy Birdsall and Devesh Kapur (2005, 3) have noted, the notion of an agreed set of 
policy recommendations or “Washington Consensus,” as coined by John Williamson, no longer exists. 
The current trend puts a greater emphasis on incorporating country-speciﬁc input and promoting 
country ownership in the formulation of policy proposals requiring greater engagement of borrowing 
governments. Such a shift also has important implications for the interaction and future cooperation 
between the Bank and the Fund. 
To understand how the Bretton Woods sisters should adjust to their changing environment, it 
is important to have a deeper understanding of how and under what circumstances they cooperate. 
These factors are often hard to pinpoint, because the reports and reviews of Bank-Fund cooperation, 
though extensive, are largely based on internal or anecdotal evidence. Few are informed by scientiﬁc 
research. One attempt to follow a more empirical approach was carried out by the two organizations 
in the context of the 2004 IMF–World Bank progress report on Bank-Fund collaboration. A survey 
was sent out to staﬀ and national authorities of borrowing governments with speciﬁc questions 
regarding the contexts and motivations for communication and cooperation between the two 
organizations, particularly in country settings. The report points out the signiﬁcant limitations of 
the survey in terms of selection bias and coverage, but provides some insights into factors relating 
to Bank-Fund collaboration that support the ﬁndings of this study. Speciﬁcally, the analysis of 
survey responses named the following as factors contributing to eﬀective communication between 
the two organizations: “consistency of views, clarity and complementarity of the division of labor, 
4. As will be discussed in more detail in section III, delineating core responsibilities has been the main feature of agreements and 
mechanisms for cooperation, particularly in the 1989 Concordat. 6
coordination in shared areas of responsibility, complementary lending or intervention instruments, 
and relations between country teams” (IMF and World Bank 2004, 21). Ownership on behalf of 
national authorities was also found to enhance collaboration since “having their own, country-
driven development strategy . . . increase[d] the demand for well-coordinated policy advice, program 
design, and conditionality by the two institutions” (IMF and World Bank, 2004, 21). At the same 
time, factors impeding collaboration included lack of country leadership and ownership and unequal 
presence in the countries, as well as “diﬀerences in institutional strategy and management styles, 
internal bureaucracy, and poor personal relations” (IMF and World Bank 2004, 21). 
Focus of the Empirical Study
As will be developed in this paper, the results tested in the present study largely conﬁrm these ﬁndings 
and go much further. The study serves to ﬁll a gap in the empirical knowledge about factors associated 
with Bank-Fund cooperation by adopting a systemic and comprehensive approach to testing them. By 
collecting evidence across countries and time periods and considering a broad range of variables relating 
to both the nature of the two organizations and the environment in which they operate, the study aims to 
provide new insights into Bank-Fund cooperation. Furthermore, the study adopts an analytic approach 
that controls for variables and allows one to hone in on the speciﬁc conditions under which the Bank and 
the Fund speak with one voice vis-à-vis borrowing governments.5
The study examines the factors associated with Bank-Fund consistency on the basis of evidence 
collected in four countries: Ghana, Vietnam, Pakistan, and Peru. Through its results and analysis, the 
study not only hopes to shed light on the eﬀectiveness of the existing mechanisms of cooperation, 
but also on which routes are most promising for ensuring Bank-Fund consistency and ways to adapt 
these mechanisms to the shifting priorities of today’s lending environment. It is also worth noting that 
while this study focuses on the Bank and the Fund, its interest is conﬁned to matters of Bank-Fund 
cooperation. By concentrating on policy-based lending (i.e., resources disbursed in exchange for speciﬁc 
policy measures to be taken by the borrowing government), this study neglects other activities oﬀered 
to member countries, i.e., the Fund’s surveillance and technical assistance, the Bank’s project lending, 
and activities such as research, training programs, and statistical work. While these activities absorb a 
signiﬁcant share of the two organizations’ resources, this study considers them only to the extent that they 
are found relevant to Bank-Fund cooperation in policy-based lending. Furthermore, this study does not 
evaluate the policy advice the Bank and the Fund give to their borrowing countries. 
The empirical research presented in sections I and II draws on various sources of information to 
design the variables used to measure factors of Bank-Fund consistency. Information has been obtained not 
5. It is worth noting that although the rich literature on organizations identiﬁes various factors which are expected to aﬀect 
the relationship between diﬀerent organizations, no study is known to the author which tries to test the explanatory power 
of individual factors in a systematic way. To the extent that international organizations have become powerful actors in 
international relations, understanding their interaction becomes as important as understanding the relations between nation 
states always has been.7
only from scholarly publications and journalistic accounts, but also from extensive interviews conducted 
in the countries’ capitals with decision makers, bureaucrats, representatives of bilateral donors, and local 
observers. Access to information was often subject to factors beyond the author’s control, in particular the 
individuals’ accessibility, time, and conﬁdence.6
The subsequent sections aim to demonstrate that the failure to understand the factors inﬂuencing 
Bank-Fund cooperation and to appreciate the changing priorities for policy lending will continue to 
undermine the organizations’ attempts to provide sound policy recommendations to their members. 
Perhaps it has been this failure which causes the struggle over the division of labor between the sister 
organizations to resurface again and again. For example, in a March 2006 announcement the heads of 
the two organizations established an External Review Committee to examine the progress of Bank-Fund 
collaboration pushing up the review scheduled for mid-2007. Speciﬁcally, the Committee was charged 
with examining the division of labor between the two organizations and give recommendations as to 
“what ways, if any, may the demarcation of responsibilities be better applied, altered, or made more 
precise, in order to achieve more eﬃcient and eﬀective delivery of services to the membership of both 
institutions” (IMF 2006, paragraph 9). The following pages attempt to contribute to this aim as well. 
6. In total, about 800 interviews have been conducted in Washington, the capitals of the countries, and elsewhere. On average, 
each interview lasted between 70 and 90 minutes. 8
I.  FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS: METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES 
The study described in this section attempts to answer the following question: When and under what 
conditions do the IMF and the World Bank adopt consistent stances vis-à-vis borrowing governments? To 
do so, a model was developed to examine Bank-Fund cooperation against a set of conditions hypothesized 
to explain whether or not the two organizations speak with one voice. Four countries—Ghana, Peru, 
Vietnam, and Pakistan—were included in the study based on two criteria. First, the Bank and the Fund 
had to have been simultaneously engaged in policy-based lending operations in the given country. Second, 
an indication that both the instances of Bank-Fund cooperation must be present and the conditions 
hypothesized to aﬀect it would show some variation over time. 
Units of Analysis: Episodes and Issues
The study looks at Bank-Fund cooperation over a 16-year time frame (1980–96), though each country’s 
“exposure” to the two Bretton Woods organizations varies. To facilitate the analysis, the study divides 
a country’s experience with the Bank and the Fund into several time-bound episodes reﬂecting the 
fact that the Bank and the Fund provided it with policy-based lending over several years. The diﬀerent 
episodes have been deﬁned in such a way that each one is characterized by a speciﬁc set of conditions, 
or explanatory variables. Hence, whereas the presence or absence of certain conditions could vary across 
episodes (and countries, of course), variables remain stable within each episode. Furthermore, the length 
of episodes varies considerably, ranging from some months to several years. For example, ﬁgure 1 presents 
all ﬁve of the episodes that have been deﬁned for Ghana. As shown in table 1, a total of 16 episodes have 
been obtained for the four countries in this study. Of course, this sample cannot claim to be representative 
of all situations in which the Bank and the Fund are involved. It does, however, attempt to reﬂect a 
diverse range of settings that represents a considerable portion of the situations in which the Bank and the 
Fund operate. 
Some of the conditions hypothesized to explain the cooperation between the Fund and the Bank 
are not speciﬁc to time-bound episodes, but to individual policy issues. These conditions include the 
government’s technical capacity and the comparative advantage maintained by either of the two Bretton 
Woods organizations in addressing a speciﬁc issue. Therefore, a second set of observations is used to 
examine Bank-Fund cooperation on individual policy issues addressed by the two organizations during a 
given episode. For a speciﬁc policy issue to qualify as an additional observation, both organizations had to 
have taken a stance on it. This criterion generated a total of 26 issue-related observations, each falling into 
one of the 16 episodes.7 Table 2 shows that the policy issues that have been considered fall under both 
microareas and macroareas. Taking the total of issues and episodes together, this study analyzes Bank-
Fund cooperation on the basis of 42 observations.
7. As both episode-speciﬁc and issue-speciﬁc factors may explain whether or not the Bank and the Fund cooperate on a given 
issue, the number of explanatory variables is higher for issues than for episodes (12 explanatory variables versus 9, respectively).9
One critical component of this study’s methodology is the way it assesses Bank-Fund cooperation, 
which is measured in terms of consistency of the stances the two organizations take vis-à-vis borrowing 
governments. Speciﬁcally, the two organizations must take the same stance for all issues to be considered 
consistent for that episode. Hence, the operations of the Bank and the Fund are considered consistent 
only in episodes in which there is no evidence of inconsistency for any single issue.
Framework of Analysis 
Although there is no coherent theory that would provide guidance to this study, there is a wealth of 
anecdotal evidence and various bodies of research that, based on a priori reasoning, are relevant in 
explaining whether or not the Bank and the Fund cooperate. In operationalizing the research setup, three 
theoretical concepts have been used to derive the explanatory variables hypothesized to aﬀect Bank-Fund 
cooperation. These concepts are structural similarity between the two organizations, domain consensus, 
and negotiation dynamics. The following sections describe each concept and corresponding explanatory 
variables in detail to provide a solid theoretical basis for interpreting the ﬁndings of the country research 
presented in the next section. Figure 2 provides an overview of the model with all explanatory variables. 
Due to their highly qualitative nature, they are all measured as binary variables.
Structural Similarity 
The ﬁrst theoretical concept for explaining Bank-Fund cooperation is that similar organizational 
structures—both the formal structure of an organization as well as its operational processes—facilitate 
communication. This concept, developed for understanding communication within organizations, 
states that diﬀerences in the structures and procedures of two organizational entities may impede their 
communication. According to James March and Herbert Simon (1993, 142), the relevant structural 
features include diﬀerences in the degrees of centralization between the two organizations, disparities 
between egalitarian norms (often associated with American culture) and authoritarian hierarchies, and the 
logic of the organizational structure (e.g., functional vs. geographical divisions of responsibility). Features 
related to operational processes include the degree to which decisionmaking processes are formal vs. 
informal and diﬀerences in the dominant patterns of internal communication (e.g., written vs. verbal). 
In relating structural similarities to the level of communication, this concept draws on two 
theoretical lines of reasoning. The ﬁrst is transaction cost economics. This theory argues that the greater 
the diﬀerence between the structures of two organizational entities, the higher the costs individuals face 
when they share information and engage in processes of joint decisionmaking. From this perspective, 
factors driving up the “cost” of communicating between two organizations may include the additional 
time needed to identify one’s counterpart in the other organization or to prepare the logistics necessary to 
hold personal meetings.
The concept’s second line of reasoning draws upon the importance of trust and personal familiarity 
in enabling communication. If similar organizational structures in two organizations persist over time, 10
they can be expected to facilitate the ﬂow of information in two ways. First, they provide the framework 
to allow for personal trust between the individuals in each organization to develop. Second, they may 
give rise to standardized patterns of communication between organizational entities. Once processes 
are standardized, they lead to the establishment of ﬁrm channels of communication between two 
organizations (Aldrich 1979, 277). In this context, March and Simon (1993, 119) point out that “the 
greater the amount of past experience with a decision situation, the less probable that intraindividual 
organizational conﬂict will arise.”
This concept of structural similarity provides the basis for deriving three variables which are 
hypothesized to aﬀect Bank-Fund cooperation. These variables are the similarity of operational styles, the 
similarity of resident mission arrangements and personal friction and are described below. 
Similarity of Operational Styles. This variable is hypothesized to aﬀect Bank-Fund cooperation as 
follows: Diﬀerent operational styles prevent the Bank and the Fund from cooperating. Drawing on the 
reasoning presented above, this hypothesis reﬂects what some observers have pointed to as causes of 
Bank-Fund inconsistency. For example, Miller (1989, 118) argues that, given the diﬀerent speeds of the 
two organizations, there is “bound to be a clash of cultures between those who work in the ﬁre brigade 
handling short-term emergencies [i.e., Fund staﬀ] and those who work where the long-term aspects 
dominate [i.e., Bank staﬀ].”8
The term “operational style” denotes the operational practices which are assumed to have a 
bearing on Bank-Fund communication. In measuring this variable, three aspects have been taken into 
consideration. The ﬁrst is similarity in each organization’s consistency across all organizational units (in 
particular, across resident missions and headquarters). The second aspect is similarity in the degree of 
continuity in each organization’s staﬃng, and the third is similarity in the two organizations’ operational 
speed.9
Similarity of Resident Mission Arrangements. The reasoning above leads to another hypothesis about 
Bank-Fund cooperation, namely that the two organizations do not cooperate if only one of them has 
a resident mission in the recipient country. If only one of the two Bretton Woods organizations has 
a resident mission in a given country, its operations are assumed to diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the other 
organization’s operations. In particular, operational diﬀerences refer to the patterns of interaction with 
government authorities as well as to the role Washington headquarters’ staﬀ play in orchestrating the 
organization’s operations in borrowing countries. 
This variable also captures the diﬀerence in the degree of secrecy that seems to characterize the 
operations of the two organizations. Speciﬁcally, the Fund has prided itself on being more conﬁdential in 
8. In a similar vein, Feinberg (1986, 16) attributes occasional diﬃculties in Bank-Fund cooperation to what he refers to as 
“ideological, procedural, and bureaucratic obstacles.” 
9. Further details about how this and all subsequent variables are measured is presented in appendix A.11
its operations than the Bank.10 According to ﬁndings from interviews and anecdotal evidence from the 
country research, diﬀerent levels of secrecy imply that in situations where the Bank (but not the Fund) 
had a resident mission in the borrowing country’s capital, Fund staﬀ often tended to be more reluctant 
to share information with Bank staﬀ for fear that they might violate the conﬁdentiality of the Fund’s 
operations. Alternatively, if both the Bank and the Fund had resident missions in the borrowing country, 
Fund staﬀ often found it easier to follow the Bank’s mission operations more closely and would be more 
willing to share information.
Personal Friction Between Senior Staﬀs. The third variable is based on the hypothesis that the two 
organizations fail to cooperate if personal friction exists between their senior staﬀ members. Needless to 
emphasize, communication depends not only on organizational structures but also on personal attitudes. 
Jacques Polak (1994, c-149) described this as follows: 
The extent to which the two staﬀs [of the Bank and the Fund] worked together on macroeconomic 
policy advice in individual countries depended to a large extent on the attitudes of regional 
managers. 
Therefore, apart from attitudes towards Bank-Fund cooperation, there is, of course, personal 
sympathy and understanding between the individuals involved (or the lack thereof) that aﬀects whether 
or not the Bank and the Fund cooperate.11
Domain Consensus 
Domain consensus, the second concept used to select the explanatory variables in the study, relates to 
whether each organization agrees with the boundaries of the other organization’s activities in a given 
situation. As has been found for the Bank’s and the Fund’s operations (e.g., in the course of the Asian 
Crisis) the staﬀ of one organization may disapprove of the scope of the other’s operations. Such episodes 
are said to be characterized by domain dissent. Conversely, episodes in which an organization approves 
of the scope of the other’s activities are characterized by domain consensus. Both domain dissent and 
domain consensus are hypothesized to aﬀect Bank-Fund cooperation via the eﬀect they are assumed to 
have on communication. 
A total of ﬁve variables have been derived from this concept—domain consensus, formal agreement 
of cooperation, similarity in each organization’s exposure to the recipient country, sense of economic crisis 
10. Traditionally, the Fund has been criticized as a secretive organization. Despite the Fund’s eﬀorts in recent years to be more 
open (e.g., submitting its operations to external expert reviews and increasing the number of published documents), Miles Kahler 
(2006, 267) notes that secrecy in IMF operations persists: “Although the old culture of secrecy at the IMF has been substantially
dismantled, the IMF, responding to the wishes of national governments, has moved more slowly to reveal information that could 
inﬂuence governments through public and political channels.” 
11. In the early stage of this study, many staﬀ members were asked the open question of what they felt determined the level of 
communication between the IMF and the World Bank. Many interviewees answered along the lines: “If you ask me it is all a 
matter of the chemistry between the individuals involved.”12
and ambiguity of comparative advantage. The following section explains each of the ﬁve variables 
in detail: 
Domain Consensus. The hypothesis for the variable measuring domain consensus is that the Bank 
and the Fund do not cooperate when there is domain dissent between them. According to the theory 
of organizations, situations of domain dissent and domain consensus are characterized by speciﬁc styles 
of interaction. If two organizational entities consent to the domains of their respective activities, their 
interaction can be characterized as organizational exchange.12 In this case, resources and services ﬂow 
between organizations in accordance with the “normal” interdependence between their activities (Aldrich 
1979, 266).
Compared with situations of domain consensus, situations of domain dissent are characterized 
by a diﬀerent style of interaction. Following Sol Levine and Paul White (1961, 599), such situations are 
characterized by confusion as to “who gets what for what purpose.” When the functions of the interacting 
organizations are diﬀuse, achieving domain consensus becomes a matter of constant readjustment and 
compromise, a process that corresponds to negotiation and bargaining. In situations of domain dissent, an 
organization can be expected to pursue bargaining strategies that aim to deﬁne and defend its domain or 
help it increase its independence (Scott 1992, 193–225). However, whether such disagreement alters the 
style of communication between the two organizations depends on the communication patterns already 
in place. If these patterns are strong, staﬀ members can expect them to be a vehicle by which to settle 
their disagreement and foster domain consensus. Therefore, only where there are weak communication 
channels does disagreement lead to domain dissent.13
Formal Agreement of Cooperation on the Operational Level. This variable reﬂects the hypothesis that 
formal agreements of cooperation fall short of ensuring Bank-Fund cooperation. This rationale draws 
from an analysis of the eﬀectiveness of the Policy Framework Paper (PFP), the only formal agreement on 
cooperation that was in place during the course of this study. The PFP was a collaborative mechanism 
designed to improve the Fund’s lending to low-income countries requiring the Fund, the Bank, and 
the borrowing government to jointly identify the country’s three-year policy goals.14 Yet it did not live 
up to its expectations in terms of ensuring Bank-Fund consistency for two key reasons. First, the PFP 
12. In their study of patterns of exchange between diﬀerent organizations in the health sector, Sol Levine and Paul White (1961,
583) ﬁnd domain consensus a prerequisite for organizational exchange. The authors deﬁne organizational exchange as “any 
voluntary activity between two organizations which has consequences, actual or anticipated, for the realization of their respective
goals or objectives.” 
13. Using Albert Hirschman’s framework of exit and voice (1970), disagreement between two organizations can trigger two 
responses: expressing disagreement (voice) and withholding information (exit). As long as communication channels between the 
two organizations are strong, exercising voice is rational as staﬀ members can expect that doing so will trigger the appropriate 
response on part of the other organization. However, once the communication channels are too weak to justify this expectation, 
withholding information may become more eﬀective than claiming leadership in the respective issue area and domain dissent will 
prevail.
14. The PFP mechanism was replaced by new mechanisms of collaboration like the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), 
introduced in more detail in section III.13
often remained vague and superﬁcial due to relative low-priority status among Fund operations and 
nonessential standing within Bank operations. In the case of the Fund, the trilateral PFP document was 
just one out of three documents required by Fund staﬀ to prepare during the process of negotiating a 
lending agreement and not the most important one.15 In the case of the Bank, the PFP was not directly 
linked to its own lending programs and not required at all. This asymmetry led to a PFP that remained 
vague on important issues like speciﬁc policy targets and their ties to the lending operations of the 
two organizations, leaving Bank and Fund staﬀs with a high degree of discretion in deciding how to 
coordinate their operations in the ﬁeld—at times at the expense of Bank-Fund consistency. 
A second problem with the PFP was that it failed to eﬀectively engage borrowing governments in 
negotiating policy targets. The result was often overambitious goals that required subsequent revisions. 
As guidelines about participation of the three parties in elaborating the PFP focused only on the 
drafting stage, the Bank could, for instance, be left out of the eventual revision stage contributing to 
inconsistent policy stances between the two organizations (Polak 1997, 503). Overall, though the PFP 
process facilitated the Fund’s lending operations to low-income countries,16 it demonstrates how formal 
agreements alone are insuﬃcient to ensuring that the Bank and Fund speak with one voice.17
Similarity in Each Organization’s Exposure to the Recipient Country. The hypothesis behind this 
variable is that strong diﬀerences in the Bank’s and the Fund’s exposure to the respective borrowing 
country are likely to lead to Bank-Fund inconsistency. Such inconsistency happens via the eﬀect unequal 
exposure has on domain dissent. This assumption is based on the following line of reasoning: If the Bank’s 
and the Fund’s exposure to a given borrowing country strongly diﬀers, then the organization that is 
heavily exposed to the borrowing country is likely to address areas the other organizations consider part of 
its own jurisdiction. To the extent that this leads to disagreement, domain dissent is likely to arise.18
Sense of Economic Crisis. This variable is hypothesized to aﬀect Bank-Fund consistency in the following 
way: If the economy of the borrowing country is characterized by a sense of crisis, the IMF and the 
World Bank cooperate. By deﬁnition, situations of economic crisis are characterized by macroeconomic 
imbalances that are considered unsustainable. Situations of economic crisis typically foster a common 
15.  The Fund also had to prepare (bilaterally) a staﬀ appraisal of the lending agreement and formulate a Letter of Intent. The 
emphasis of secrecy and conﬁdentiality in Fund operations meant that, at least in some cases, most of the important policy 
arrangement details were left for the Letter of Intent and not the PFP.
16. As James Boughton points out (2001, 1001), though “most PFPs in the 1980s turned out to be too broadly drafted to have 
much operational signiﬁcance, the process did serve to enable the Fund to get the SAF and its ‘enhanced’ sequel (the ESAF) 
running without provoking internecine warfare or dragging the Fund staﬀ too deeply into unfamiliar waters.”
17. As will be discussed in section III, lessons learned from the PFP experience led to changes in the design of subsequent 
cooperation mechanisms which may have contributed to more eﬀective outcomes in terms of Bank-Fund cooperation.
18. Consider the example of the World Bank having a large portfolio of projects and sectoral loans in the absence of any Fund 
program. In this case, the World Bank may engage not only in sectoral work, but also in macroeconomic work. In its policy 
dialogue with the government, the Bank is then likely to address issues that the Fund considers to fall into its responsibility.
In order to reestablish its leadership in these issue areas, the Fund may then refrain from sharing relevant information with the 
Bank.14
sense of urgency among those involved to pursue corrective measures. Among the Bretton Woods 
organizations, the Fund has traditionally been the one charged with responding to crises. In accordance 
with its traditional role as lender of last resort, its mandate for macroeconomic issues, and the relatively 
shorter time horizon of its operations, the Fund is expected to take the lead in providing policy advice 
in such situations of crisis. Correspondingly, the World Bank is expected to defer to the Fund on 
macroeconomic issues. Compared with situations of crisis, situations of relative stability are characterized 
by more ambiguous policy priorities. 19
Ambiguity of Comparative Advantage. This variable captures the rationale that if the Bank’s and 
the Fund’s comparative advantage in dealing with a speciﬁc issue is ambiguous, the two organizations 
are unlikely to cooperate. This hypothesis assumes that if neither one of the two organizations has a 
comparative advantage in addressing a speciﬁc issue, each one of the two organizations is likely to conduct 
its own analyses and develop its own conditionality. Conversely, whenever one organization is perceived 
to have a clear comparative advantage in the issue area in question, the other organization is likely to 
follow its lead. Therefore, domain dissent is more likely when each organization’s comparative advantage is 
ambiguous.
Dynamics of Negotiations
The third theoretical concept from which variables have been derived relates to the dynamics of 
negotiations between the government, the Fund, and the Bank. This concept reveals that the level 
of Bank-Fund communication is sensitive to the borrowing government’s attempts to play the two 
organizations oﬀ each other. Describing the dynamics of negotiations, van der Geest (1994, 188) points 
out that:
[n]egotiations with lending institutions, especially the World Bank, by a borrowing government 
leave considerable room for bargaining: a less ‘tight’ set of policy reforms may be traded against an 
increased likelihood of diﬃcult, or even failing, negotiations over the proposed loan. 
In other words, the stronger the party, the more it can aﬀord to employ maneuvers that might 
delay negotiations. In this context, Nelson (1990, 18) alludes to some “intricate cross-currents of support 
and rivalry. . .between the IMF and the World Bank.” 
The concept of negotiation dynamics draws on the scenario that Georg Simmel characterizes 
as tertius gaudens, a phrase describing one party that proﬁts from the disunion of others. This scenario 
deﬁnes success in negotiations in terms of the social structure of the negotiation situation (Burt 1992, 
30). In situations in which the Bank and the Fund exhibit diﬀerent views and poor communication, the 
government is more likely to have an informational advantage. The government may know more about 
19. The validity of the reasoning above hinges on the nature of the crisis. What needs to be emphasized is the concept of crisis
presented above relates to crises whose nature is macroeconomic. Crisis situations of this kind are to be distinguished from crisis 
situations whose nature is structural.15
each organization’s stance than they know about themselves. It can broaden its room for maneuvering 
by deciding which information to present to each organization and whether or not it is advantageous 
to bring the two organizations together. Consequently, the government may build value from any 
disagreement the Bank and the Fund may have (Burt 1992, 34).
For the government to be able to build value from such disagreements, two conditions have to 
be met. First, each organization’s role in advising the government with respect to a given issue must be 
unclear to create an opportunity for the tertius to broker the negotiation process by playing the two 
demands against each other (Burt 1992, 33). The second condition is poor communication between 
the Fund and the Bank. The range of the government’s opportunities is inversely related to the extent 
to which the two organizations communicate. If the two organizations do not communicate at all, the 
government may present one organization with ambiguous, distorted, or even inaccurate information 
about the other’s position.20 If, however, the two other parties become a unit (e.g., communicating and 
sharing a common stance) the group changes from a combination of three elements into that of just 
two, and the tertius slips from its favorable position (Simmel 1950, 160). As a result, the government has 
an inherent interest in pursuing a strategy of divide et impera by fostering competition between the two 
parties in order to keep them acting as diﬀerent players (Burt 1992, 31). 
Based on this line of reasoning, four variables have been hypothesized to aﬀect Bank-Fund 
cooperation. These are the government’s negotiating position, its technical capacity, similarity in each 
organization’s relationship with the borrowing country, and the level of disagreement between the 
borrowing government and the two Bretton Woods organizations.
Negotiating Position. This variable reﬂects the following hypothesis: The IMF and the World Bank are 
more likely to cooperate in situations where the government’s negotiating position is strong rather than 
weak. This hypothesis reﬂects the following reasoning: Whenever the Bank and the Fund deal with a 
strong government they face the risk that the government is trying to drive a wedge between them. This 
risk provides the two organizations with an incentive to strengthen their communication.21
For borrowing governments to be considered as having a strong negotiating position, two 
conditions need to be met. First, the government’s authorities need to speak with one voice vis-à-vis the 
Bretton Woods organizations, resulting from a high level of internal coordination among its agencies. 
Second, the government must have enough ﬁnancial breathing space that it does not urgently need 
disbursements on the part of the Bank and the Fund. Otherwise, the government would be reluctant to 
pursue any negotiating strategy that might lead to delay.
Technical Capacity. The Bank and the Fund are also thought to be more likely to cooperate in situations 
in which the government’s technical capacity is weak than in situations in which the government’s 
20. This can be seen in the episode of crossroads in Vietnam and the episode of liberalization in Ghana as described in boxes 1 
and 2, respectively (see section II for the boxes).
21. This hypothesis runs counter to what Kahler (1992, 13) suggests: He ﬁnds donor consistency inversely related to the 
negotiating position of the borrowing country.16
technical capacity is strong. This hypothesis assumes that knowledge and technical expertise inﬂuence 
the outcome of negotiations (Sebenius 1992, 325). In the case of policy issues, a high level of technical 
capacity enables the government to probe into the underpinnings and the consistency of the Bank’s 
and the Fund’s policy recommendations. In anticipation of this possibility, the two Bretton Woods 
organizations are then hypothesized to increase their communication in order to ensure the consistency of 
their stances. The eﬀect is similar to what happens when the Bank and the Fund face a government in a 
strong negotiating position during a speciﬁc episode as described above.
Similarity of Each Organization’s Relationship with the Borrowing Government. This variable reﬂects 
the rationale that similarity in the Bank’s and the Fund’s relationship with the borrowing government 
is conducive to Bank-Fund cooperation. This hypothesis assumes that communication between the 
two Bretton Woods organizations suﬀers in situations where the government’s relationship with one 
organization is considerably more adversarial than its relationship with the other. If the government’s 
relationship with one of the two Bretton Woods organizations is highly adversarial, then staﬀ members 
of that organization, concerned about further compromising their negotiation position, may become 
reluctant to share information not only with the borrowing government, but also with the other 
organization. In light of the fact that the Bank’s relationship with borrowing governments tends to be 
perceived as friendlier than the Fund’s relationship, this variable becomes particularly relevant.22
Extent of Disagreement. This variable is based on the hypothesis that the stronger the disagreement 
between the borrowing government and the two Bretton Woods organizations, the more likely the Bank 
and the Fund are to cooperate. This hypothesis assumes that whenever there is strong disagreement 
between the borrowing government and the Bretton Woods organizations, policy discussions are likely 
to remain on a rather general level—too general to address the details on which the Bank and the 
Fund might disagree. This reasoning is in line with what Vocke (1991, 190) suggests (i.e., that Bank-
Fund cooperation is more likely the greater the resistance the two organizations face on the part of the 
borrowing government). By contrast, situations in which the borrowing government shares the Bank’s and 
the Fund’s general view, program negotiations are more likely to address those details on which the Bank 
and the Fund might disagree. 
Conclusion
To summarize, a total of 12 explanatory variables have been identiﬁed based on the three concepts 
described above. Table 3 summarizes these variables and shows that most relate to time-bound episodes. 
22. Whereas the World Bank has historically been regarded as “friends of developing countries,” negotiations with the Fund 
are often less amicable (Krueger 1997, 15). This sentiment is captured in the external review of the Fund’s lending under the 
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF): “We found the Fund’s image to be rather negative at the general popular 
level, and even in relatively more informed circles. . . . In contrast, the Bank’s image in most countries was much more favorable 
although the Bank was often more intrusive in the very sectors about which people complained most” (IMF 1998, 35).17
Only three variables that have been identiﬁed relate to individual policy issues. The best way to think 
about these variables is to understand each as a condition that has been hypothesized to aﬀect whether or 
not the Bank and the Fund cooperate and measured as binary variables.23 As a result of this procedure, 
the conditions have been deﬁned for every episode and every individual policy issue.24 These data have 
been used as the basis for identifying the necessary and suﬃcient conditions of Bank-Fund cooperation. 
As mentioned in the introduction and described in detail in appendix B, the results of the study were 
analyzed using a technique called Boolean algebra for its suitability in terms of speciﬁcity and sensitivity 
to combinations of diﬀerent conditions. The results of this procedure are discussed in the following 
section.
23. The variables have been coded on the basis of speciﬁc indicators, which have been deﬁned for each variable. For deﬁnitions
of these indicators, see appendix A. 
24. For an example of how the value for each of the variables has been derived from the analysis of country evidence, see the 
interpretation of the Pakistani episode of bureaucratic rule in appendix C. For the complete analysis and interpretation of the 
country analysis, see Fabricius (1999).18
















































Table 3    Overview of explanatory variables
Unit of analysis
Concept Variable Episodes Issues
Structural similarity Similarity of operational styles x
Similarity of resident mission arrangements x
Personal friction between senior staﬀs x
Domain consensus Domain consensus x
Agreement on cooperation at the operational level x
Similarity in each organization’s exposure to borrowing country x
Sense of economic crisis x
Ambiguity of comparative advantage x
Dynamics of 
negotiation Negotiating position of government x
Technical capacity of government x
Similarity of each organization’s relationship with borrowing country x
Extent of disagreement between government and Fund/Bank x
Source: Fabricius (1999).2
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Educational Sector Adjustment Credit
StructuralAdjustment Credit (SAC)
Financial Sector Adjustment Credit
Second SAC
Second Educational Structural Adjustment Credit
Priv. Inv. Prom. Credit
Second FinancialSector Adjustment Loan
Agricultural Sectoral Adjustment Loan
Priv. Sec. Adj. Cred.
World Bank Adjustment Loans
Turnaround Rehabilitation Ambiguity Liberalization




EFF=Extended Fund Facility; ESAF=Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility; SAF=Structural Adjustment Facility; SBA=Stand-by Arrangements
Source: Fabricius (1999, 114).22
Figure 2     Model to analyze Bank-Fund cooperation
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patterns between two 
organizations depend 
on the degree to 
which they consent to 
the domain of their 
respective activities.” 
“Communication between
two organizations is 
sensitive to attempts by 
third parties to play the 
two agents off against 
each other.” 
A = Agreement of cooperation on operational level
C = Cooperation between the Bank and the Fund 
D = Domain consensus 
G = Extent of disagreement between government and Bank/Fund 
I = Similarity in each organization’s exposure to borrowing country
M = Similarity of resident mission arrangements
N = Negotiating position of government 
O = Similarity of operational styles
P = Personal friction between senior staffs 
R = Similarity of each organization’s relationship with recipient country
S = Sense of economic crisis 
T = Technical capacity of government
U = Ambiguity of comparative advantage23
II. CONDITIONS OF BANKFUND COOPERATION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Country Evidence
Employing the variables described in the preceding section, the study examined the conditions under 
which the Fund and the Bank spoke with the same voice vis-à-vis four borrowing country governments 
over a span of 16 years. Table 4 summarizes the country research by presenting the episode-speciﬁc 
variables for the 16 episodes identiﬁed for the study. The column with the heading “C” shows whether the 
Bank and the Fund were found to be cooperating. The rest of the columns present the speciﬁc conditions 
that were either present or absent in each episode. All the conditions hypothesized to explain Bank-Fund 
cooperation are shown to vary across observations and most across episodes, though some variables (i.e., 
personal friction [P] and sense of economic crisis [S]) showed little variation. Concerning Bank-Fund 
cooperation, column C shows that the Bank and the Fund were found to cooperate in 10 (or 63 percent) 
of these episodes with at least one episode of cooperation and noncooperation occurring per country. 
What table 4 shows for the various episodes, table 5 shows for individual policy issues, oﬀering 
evidence of the diﬀerences in Bank-Fund cooperation grouped across seven main policy areas.25 The table 
shows that regarding ﬁscal policy, the Bank and the Fund cooperated in only one out of ﬁve cases. For 
both privatization and macroeconomic policy, the Bank and the Fund cooperated in three out of ﬁve 
cases. Instances of inconsistency have also been encountered in ﬁnancial sector reform, trade policy, and 
cocoa policy. Aid coordination is the only issue area in which no instance of noncooperation has been 
found. Overall, the Bank and the Fund were found to have cooperated on 15 of the 26 policy issues 
observed. Hence, the likelihood of cooperation (in this limited sample) for individual policy issues is 
roughly similar to the likelihood of cooperation found for various episodes (58 percent). Taken together, 
the data presented in these two tables provide the basis for identifying the conditions under which the 
Bank and the Fund cooperate and fail to cooperate, respectively.
Results of the Analysis
The formal analysis yields a picture of remarkable consistency.26 Whether or not the Bank and the 
Fund cooperate has been found to depend on two conditions: similarity in the Bank’s and the Fund’s 
operational styles (O) and domain consensus (D). These two conditions are highly correlated. That is, 
whenever the Bank and the Fund operate in similar styles, domain consensus often exists. Furthermore, 
whenever the Bank and the Fund exhibited similar operational styles (and there was domain consensus), 
25. Readers will notice that table 5 contains the same variables as table 4 since each issue falls into one of the episodes presented
in the latter. The tables diﬀer, however, in that table 5 includes the additional issue-speciﬁc variables, i.e., ambiguity of the two 
organizations’ comparative advantage (U), the government’s technical capacity (T), and the extent of disagreement between the 
government and the Bank/Fund (G). 
26. For details of the formal analysis, see Fabricius (1999, 495–529).24
they presented consistent policy stances. Conversely, the Bank and the Fund took diﬀerent stances 
whenever their operational styles diﬀered and domain dissent was present.27 Once these conditions are 
taken into consideration, none of the other variables show any signiﬁcant correlation with Bank-Fund 
cooperation. Given the prominent importance of domain consensus and similarity in operational styles, 
the following section will examine these two conditions in more detail. 
Domain Dissent 
As mentioned above, domain consensus denotes whether the staﬀ members of one organization approve 
of the scope of the other organization’s activities. Disapproval leads to domain dissent and corresponds to 
what is usually referred to as “turf battle.” As shown in tables 4 and 5, domain dissent has been found in 
ﬁve episodes and ﬁve issues. The contextual evidence collected for each of the four countries allows us to 
identify four drivers of domain dissent.
The ﬁrst driver of domain dissent relates to the individuals involved. The reason, as supported by 
the evidence of this study, is that in many cases, information exchange has been subject to the decisions 
of individuals. Furthermore, the study found only a few instances in which the exchange of information 
between the Bank and the Fund could be characterized as institutionalized.28 Instead, Bank-Fund 
interaction depends highly on the preferences and personal styles of individuals. Personal preferences 
seemed to guide whether or not individual staﬀ members decided to go out of their way in order to 
seek consultations with their counterparts. For some individuals, reaching an agreement with their 
counterparts across 19th Street ranked fairly high on their agenda. For others, it did not—and therefore, 
agreements did not happen. Interviews and country research carried out for the study found no evidence 
that failure to cooperate with the Fund/Bank) would hurt a Bank/Fund staﬀ member’s standing in his/her 
organization. This observation suggests that the capability to establish working relationships across the 
two organizations has not suﬃciently entered the set of performance criteria which inﬂuence personnel 
decision making. 
Highlighting the important roles individuals can play in determining domain dissent, evidence 
from the study shows situations in which turnover in a key operational position led to a shift from 
domain consensus to domain dissent (and vice versa). For example, table 4 shows that in the case 
of Vietnam the transition from the episode of reform promotion to the episode of crossroads was 
accompanied by a change from domain consensus to domain dissent. As documented in box 1, this shift 
27. As shown in table 4, the Peruvian episode of reintegration is the only episode in which the Bank and the Fund did not 
cooperate in combination with domain consensus. In all other observations, domain consensus was accompanied by cooperation 
between the Bank and the Fund. This ﬁnding may reﬂect the speciﬁc nature of this episode (Fabricius 1999, 468–78). 
Alternatively, however, it may result from diﬀerences in the quality of information that was taken into consideration in coding 
the individual variables. Compared with other episodes, the Peruvian episode of reintegration was characterized by more limited 
access to key staﬀ members of the Bank and the Fund as well as by shorter interviews. This may have led to measurement error.
28. This corresponds to the ﬁndings of the external evaluation of the Fund’s ESAF programs during the same time period of 
the study: “Our sense is that in spite of the progress that has been made in the past few years in forging harmony in Fund/Bank
relations, too much still depends on personalities” (IMF 1998, 58).25
Box 1    Individuals make a diﬀerence: The Vietnamese episode of crossroads 
The episode of reform promotion (1994–96) in Vietnam which preceded the episode of crossroads (1996–97) was 
characterized by eﬀorts on the part of both the Bank and the Fund to further advance the economic reform process 
which began in the 1980s. The Bank’s and the Fund’s operations were highly interdependent not only with respect 
to monetary policy but also with respect to ﬁscal policy. Staﬀ members of the two organizations engaged in various 
modes of communication, including meetings between the staﬀ members of the two organizations and joint mis-
sions. During this episode, the two organizations exhibited domain consensus and consistent policy stances regard-
ing all policy issues in which they were simultaneously engaged (see table 4).
Both consistency and domain consensus disappeared in the subsequent episode of crossroads. The shift was 
due to break downs in communication resulting from a changeover in Bank staﬀ. Staﬀ members who had held key 
positions for several years left their division. In particular, the Bank’s new country director took an active interest 
in managing the Bank’s operations in Vietnam which contrasted to the laissez-faire attitude of his predecessor. In 
the opinion of one interviewee, document sharing during the episode of crossroads became “too much subject to 
personality, not institutionalized enough.” Although no case of personal friction was detected, the relationships 
between key staﬀ members in both organizations’ country teams came to be less cordial than the relationships 
between their predecessors. One staﬀ member pointed out that after the change in each organization’s team, “some 
chemistry ha[d] to be built up again.”
The staﬀ changes also contributed to inconsistencies in the policy stances of the two organizations. The Bank 
and Fund staﬀs stopped going out of their way to ensure that they were speaking with one voice vis-à-vis the Viet-
namese government. One senior staﬀ member of the Bank expressed this as follows: 
It is quite normal to have professional disagreements once diﬀerent economists work on something. 
. . . Sometimes it is important to disagree—as long as that does not lead to friction. And sometimes, 
it may be beneﬁcial to the government to get diﬀerent opinions; then they can better see what the 
issues are.
In the light of this attitude the two organizations started to operate in parallel rather than in concert. According 
to one interviewee, there was some “confusion over the Bank’s and the Fund’s mandates.” The crossroads episode 
demonstrates how a change in personnel can be at the heart of shifts from domain consent to domain dissent and 
inconsistencies. 
Such a break down in communication appears to have opened the two Bretton Woods organizations up to 
more than just disagreement. In the episode of crossroads, the government seemed to make eﬀorts to broaden its 
room for maneuver by exploiting what seemed to be a declining level of communication and coordination between 
the Bank and the Fund. More speciﬁcally, the government explicitly requested the Bank’s opinion on interest rate 
policy despite the fact that the Fund had traditionally taken the lead in this area. Rather than deferring to the Fund, 
the Bank’s country team developed its own recommendation on interest rate policy which diﬀered from the Fund’s. 
Whereas in previous episodes, the two organizations reconciled these diﬀerences of opinion among themselves, 
they surfaced once the communication between the Bank and the Fund deteriorated.
can be attributed primarily to the attitude of the incoming senior staﬀ members. Clearly, if the process of 
consultation between the Bank and the Fund on Vietnam had been institutionalized, turnover in a key 
position would not have triggered such a shift. 
The second driver of domain dissent is turf sensitivity. Although individuals have been shown, as in 
the case of Vietnam, to foster domain dissent, individuals also face limits in the extent to which they can 26
set the tone of Bank-Fund cooperation. Such limitations can result from guidance by senior managers, 
presence of career incentives, and what is often vaguely referred to as “organizational culture.” In several 
episodes during the study, strong turf sensitivity and resulting protectionist stance was found to lead to 
domain dissent. It is worth emphasizing that, when found, this turf sensitivity occurred exclusively among 
individuals in the Fund and never on the part of the Bank. The Fund’s sensitivity seemed to be highest 
with respect to matters of macroeconomic and exchange rate policy. This impression is in line with the 
ﬁndings of an external evaluation of Fund programs in low-income countries: Commenting on some 
complaints among Bank staﬀ, the report states that “Fund staﬀ are often cast in an inﬂexible mold by 
their brieﬁng papers and mandates, and are much to quick to plead jurisdiction and turf when diﬀerences 
arise” (IMF 1998, 58).
The third driver of domain dissent is operational redundancy between the Fund and the Bank. As 
shown in table 5, domain dissent was only encountered in three policy areas, namely macroeconomic 
policy, ﬁscal policy, and ﬁnancial sector reform. For other policy areas (i.e., privatization, agricultural 
policy, trade policy, and aid coordination) no single instance of domain dissent was encountered. It is 
important to note that in each of the policy areas where domain dissent was observed, the Bank and the 
Fund carried out independent assessments and came to independent conclusions about the stance to be 
taken vis-à-vis the borrowing government. This observation suggests the following: If there been a clear 
division of labor in place and had only one organization analyzed the issue in question, domain consensus 
would have been more likely.
The fourth driver of domain dissent is not internal to the Bank and the Fund, but part of the 
country setting in which they operate. The evidence suggests that at least to some extent, domain 
dissent is driven by the negotiation strategy of borrowing governments. In four out of ﬁve cases of 
domain dissent, the negotiating position of the borrowing government was strong. Contextual evidence 
also conﬁrms this relationship: At times, borrowing governments (e.g., the Vietnamese government) 
demonstrated a remarkable skill in driving a wedge between the two organizations. Such evidence rejects 
the initial hypothesis regarding technical capacity and conﬁrms Miles Kahler’s (1992, 113) ﬁnding that 
donor consistency is inversely related to the bargaining capacity of the borrowing country.29
Whereas these four drivers explain the emergence of domain dissent, they fail to explain all cases 
of Bank-Fund inconsistency. Table 5 shows various policy issues for which the Bank and Fund did not 
experience domain dissent yet still took diﬀerent stances. For example, such a situation applies to wage 
policy in the Ghanaian episode of ambiguity, tax policy in the Peruvian episode of reintegration, and 
matters of privatization in the Vietnamese episode of crossroads. At ﬁrst glance, these observations might 
contradict the results presented above (i.e., the ﬁnding that Bank-Fund consistency has always been found 
associated with domain consensus). Instead, these observations reﬂect a particular feature of domain 
dissent: It is contagious and can spill over from one issue area to another. This spill-over eﬀect is hardly 
29.  Note that this does not support the conclusion that a strong negotiating position on the part of the borrowing government 
necessarily leads to inconsistency between donors. In three out of the four sample countries—Pakistan, Vietnam, and Ghana—
there were episodes in which the Bank and the Fund were consistent, despite the government’s strong negotiating position.27
Box 2    Organizational consistency in the case of liberalization in Ghana
During the Ghanaian episode of liberalization (1987–90), the area of overlap between the Bank and the Fund in-
creased, particularly in the area of macroeconomic policy. Throughout the episode, the Fund’s country team took 
issue with the advice the Bank provided to the government on matters of macroeconomic policy. As one Fund oﬃcial 
put it, the Fund’s country team felt “irritated” and “annoyed” by the Bank’s interest in macroeconomic issues. Further-
more, there is strong evidence suggesting that staﬀ members of the Fund were reluctant to share information with 
their Bank counterparts in order to defend the Fund’s leadership on macroeconomic issues. One staﬀ member of the 
Fund described this attitude as follows: “We shared some information, but we did not want to get their comments; 
only their endorsements. We felt that the Bank should not worry about these issues.”
The ensuing turf battles led to greater break downs in communication between the two organizations. Fund 
staﬀ was concerned that insights in ongoing discussions of exchange rate policy would not be kept conﬁdential 
if Bank staﬀ participated in the Fund’s meeting with the government. Therefore, Fund staﬀ made every eﬀort to 
schedule meeting times in a way that Bank staﬀ could not participate (e.g., by scheduling parallel meetings of little 
importance that Fund staﬀ strongly recommended their Bank counterparts to attend). 
Contributing to diﬃculties in the Bank’s and the Fund’s relationship during this episode were the diﬀerences in 
intraorganizational consistency. The issue of civil service reform during this episode provides an example. The Bank 
and the Fund agreed that Ghana’s civil service needed reform. However, the Bank’s senior management did not sup-
port the preliminary agreement that the Bank’s country team had negotiated. This disagreement reﬂected the fact 
that the wage bill, as proposed by the Bank’s country team, would have exceeded the ﬁscal target the IMF had nego-
tiated with the government. After discussions between senior staﬀ of both organizations—on the level of the Bank’s 
vice president for operations and the Fund’s deputy managing director—the Bank’s senior management decided 
that the civil service reform had to be consistent with the Fund’s ﬁscal targets. The Bank’s ﬁeld staﬀ, however, felt that 
Washington management yielded to the Fund for reasons other than the technical merits of the Fund’s position. As 
one member of the Bank’s staﬀ put it, “the Bank’s management was not prepared to back their economists.” Given 
the weakness of the Bank’s country team, not only the government but also the Fund’s country team preferred to 
deal with the Bank’s senior manager. Against this background, it is not surprising that recommendations the Bank’s 
country team presented to the government diﬀered from those of the Fund’s team. 
During this episode, the government held such issues like civil society reform as lower-priority than the Bret-
ton Woods organizations and seemed to beneﬁt from inconsistency between the two organizations. One member 
of Ghana’s Economic Management Team said that “there were some things we would not have achieved if the two 
organizations had cooperated more closely.” Reﬂecting the government’s strategic management of its relationship 
with the Bretton Woods sisters, another Ghanaian oﬃcial stated, “With the IMF and the World Bank, it is like in boxing: 
You want to be close to your adversary.” As such, Bank-Fund inconsistencies broadened the government’s room for 
maneuver and made it easier for the government to pursue its own preferences. 
surprising given the way the Fund and the Bank work. In many instances, the same individuals work on 
various issues. Hence, once domain dissent emerges in one issue area it may lead staﬀ members to become 
more reluctant to share information not only in this area, but also in other areas.
Diﬀerent Operational Styles
In addition to the drivers mentioned above, domain dissent also seems to have been driven by another 
factor measured as a separate variable, namely the diﬀerences in the two organizations’ operational 28
styles. Taking a closer look at the research, this variable was measured on the basis of the following 
three indicators: similarity in the degree of staﬀ turnover, similarity in the degree of intraorganizational 
consistency, and similarity in the two organizations’ operational speed.30 As shown in table 6, diﬀerences 
in the degree of staﬀ turnover have been the most frequent indication of diﬀerent operational styles.
Compared with domain dissent, diﬀerences in the Bank’s and the Fund’s operational styles show 
an important diﬀerence: As mentioned above, domain dissent was primarily driven by the attitude 
of Fund staﬀ as there was no single incidence of Bank staﬀ disapproving of the scope of the Fund’s 
operations. Concerning diﬀerent operational styles, the opposite applies: Variation stems from diﬀerences 
primarily in Bank operational consistency, speed, and staﬀ turnover across countries. The Fund, however, 
demonstrated remarkable consistency in operational style geographically and over time.
Based on the contextual evidence, the study identiﬁed three channels of transmission through 
which diﬀerent operational styles contribute to inconsistency. First, higher staﬀ turnover rates in the Bank 
compromised professional relationships and communication patterns needed to ensure consistency. High 
levels of (perceived) staﬀ turnover (as expressed in the course of interviews with the Bank’s counterparts in 
the Fund as well as within the government) often led to the impression of rupture in the Bank’s working 
relationship with others. Country evidence showed that productive working relationships often eroded 
due to insuﬃcient brieﬁng of incoming staﬀ and/or conﬁdence between counterparts being lost amidst 
high turnover rates. On the other hand, the Fund’s more centralized decision-making structure and 
greater emphasis on protecting institutional memory meant that even where turnover existed, perception 
of rupture and setbacks was that much smaller. 
The second channel operates via diﬀerent levels of intraorganizational inconsistency. For example, 
the research found that the Bank’s representatives in borrowing countries often presented a diﬀerent view 
than the Bank’s senior management in Washington. Whenever the Bank sent diﬀerent signals, it may have 
led to some frustration on behalf of the Bank’s counterparts since it can foster doubts as to whether the 
Bank’s mission in the ﬁeld (or its resident mission) represents the view of the organization.31 The Fund, 
in contrast, pays substantial attention to ensure that its staﬀ members present a uniﬁed and consistent 
message to the outside world. The authority to speak on behalf of the organization to outsiders—whether 
member countries or the public at large—is subject to strict rules and usually reserved for senior staﬀ 
members. Before any statement is made, a comprehensive (some say, somewhat excessive) system of 
iterative reviews ensures that it is consistent with the organization’s view.32 As a result of this diﬀerence, 
30. In coding this variable, positive evidence for at least one of these three indicators has been considered suﬃcient to consider 
the two organizations’ operational styles as diﬀerent.
31. This sense of frustration has been described in the external evaluation of the Fund’s programs for Vietnam by stating that 
“the asymmetry in the level of authority exercisable by Bank and Fund resident missions—Bank resident missions have greater 
decision-making authority than Fund resident representatives—makes it diﬃcult to conduct proper dialogue on, and coordinate, 
policy discussions in the ﬁeld as conﬂicts often have to be deferred to Washington” (IMF 1998, 95).
32. This high level of intraorganizational consistency has important implications for the autonomy the Fund’s country teams 
enjoy once they are “on mission” in the ﬁeld: Before the mission leaves Washington, various departments in the Fund agree on 
a mission brief that lays out the purpose of the mission at a considerable level of detail. For more details on the Fund’s internal 
processes of review and control, see Harper (1998).29
Fund staﬀ became reluctant at times to treat the Bank’s missions in the ﬁeld as counterparts. An example 
of this dynamic was found during the Ghanaian episode of liberalization, documented in box 2. 
Diﬀerent operational styles can also translate into inconsistency via a third channel: diﬀerent 
operational speeds. As mentioned in the previous section, the Fund was set up to deal with crisis 
situations and so is capable of very rapid operations. The Bank’s more long-term focus tends to translate 
into less agility, operationally speaking. The country case studies showed that frustrations arising between 
the Fund and the Bank from their diﬀerent operational speeds often led to duplication of eﬀorts. 
For instance, the Fund staﬀ, frustrated with the Bank’s failure to meet ambitious deadlines for their 
contributions, would often carry out the tasks themselves. The duplication of eﬀorts would often lead to 
break downs in communication and inconsistency. This corresponds to one of the ﬁndings of the external 
evaluation of the Fund’s program under the ESAF (IMF 1998, 58). 
Among the Fund staﬀ, there is some impatience with what is perceived as indecision on the part of 
the Bank on key issues within its core competence (especially expenditure analysis) and undue tardiness in 
delivering inputs for joint documents and programs.
Summary: What Drives Consistency? 
The empirical evidence shows that Bank-Fund consistency depends critically on the level of 
communication between the two organizations. Furthermore, the evidence collected at the country 
level suggests that the most diﬃcult factor that Bank and Fund staﬀ must overcome to ensure domain 
consensus is the diﬀerence between the two organizations’ operational styles. Such diﬀerences represent 
not only the diﬀerent objectives of the two organizations, but also their distinct operational models. 
To the extent that the diﬀerences between the two organizations’ operational models further increase, 
consistency will become more diﬃcult to achieve, especially with for example, the Fund remaining 
a highly centralized organization and the Bank strengthening its local operations in the borrowing 
countries.
Whereas both domain dissent and diﬀerences in the Bank’s and the Fund’s operational styles 
provide an explanation for Bank-Fund inconsistency, it is neither one of these two conditions alone, 
but their combination that explains whether or not the Bank and the Fund cooperate. As mentioned 
above, the two variables have been found to be highly correlated and are both closely tied to the extent 
of communication between the staﬀ members of the two organizations: Whereas well-established 
communication channels may ensure domain consensus, thus preventing domain dissent, diﬀerences 
in the Bank’s and the Fund’s operational styles may undermine communication on the staﬀ level. The 
country case studies provide ample evidence that diﬀerent operational styles make communication 
not only more costly, but also less likely, thus increasing the potential for communication shortfalls to 
undermine consistency. 
From management’s point of view, these ﬁndings are good news: They imply that the two 
conditions that determine Bank-Fund consistency are endogenous to Bank-Fund management. Those 30
variables that relate to the country setting in which the Bank and the Fund operate—the sense of crisis, 
the government’s negotiating position, and the government’s technical capacity—do not show any 
signiﬁcant correlation with Bank-Fund cooperation independent of the eﬀect via domain dissent. Hence, 
whether or not the Bank and Fund cooperate seems to be mostly a matter of organizational management 
rather than a matter of external conditions.31
Table 4   Summary of evidence of episodes
Country Episode P A M R S I N O D C
Ghana Turnaround 10 1 1100111
Rehabilitation 1 1 n.a. 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
Ambiguity 11 1 0011000
Liberalization 01 1 1011000
Democracy 11 1 1001011
Vietnam Opening 10 0 0011111
Reform promotion 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
Crossroads 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
Pakistan Bureaucratic rule 10 0 0011111
Turbulent transition 11 0 0001100
Democratic take-oﬀ 11 0 1011111
Deadlock 11 1 1010000
New momentum 11 1 1010111
Crisis management 10 1 1010111
Peru Fireﬁghting 10 1 1110111
Reintegration 1 0 n.a. 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
n.a. = not available
A = Agreement of cooperation on operational level
C = Cooperation between the Bank and the Fund
D = Domain consensus
I = Similarity in each organization’s exposure to borrowing country
M = Similarity of resident mission arrangements
N = Negotiating position of government
O = Similarity of operational styles
P = Personal friction between senior staﬀs
R = Similarity of each organization’s relationship with recipient country
S = Sense of economic crisis
Source: Fabricius (1999).32
Table 5   Summary of evidence of issues
Issue area Issue Episode Country P A M R S I N O D T U G C
Aid Democracy Ghana 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
Crossroads Vietnam 11 1 1011010001
Cocoa Turnaround Ghana 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
Rehabilitation Ghana 1 1 n.a. 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
Liberalization Ghana 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
Financial sector Crossroads Vietnam 11 1 1011000000
Treasury Bill Deadlock Pakistan 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Fiscal Wage increase Ambiguity Ghana 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Civil service reform Liberalization Ghana 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
VAT Democracy Ghana 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
Tax Reintegration Peru 1 0 n.a. 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 000
Turbulent transition Pakistan 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
Macro    Ambiguity Ghana 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Liberalization Ghana 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Opening Vietnam 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
Reform promotion Vietnam 11 1 1011110001
Fireﬁghting Peru 10 1 1110110001
Privatization Liberalization Ghana 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
Reform promotion Vietnam 11 1 1011110111
Crossroads Vietnam 11 1 1011010110
Reintegration Peru 1 0 n.a. 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 101
Deadlock Pakistan 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
Trade Ambiguity Ghana 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
Reform promotion Vietnam 11 1 1011110001
New momentum Pakistan 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
Regular duty Crisis management Pakistan 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
n.a. = not available
A = Agreement of cooperation on operational level
C = Cooperation between the Bank and the Fund
D = Domain consensus
G = Extent of disagreement between government and Bank/Fund
I = Similarity in each organization’s exposure to borrowing country
M = Similarity of resident mission arrangements
N = Negotiating position of government
O = Similarity of operational styles
P = Personal friction between senior staﬀs
R = Similarity of each organization’s relationship with recipient country
S = Sense of economic crisis
T = Technical capacity of government
U = Ambiguity of comparative advantage
Source: Fabricius (1999).33
















Ambiguity Ghana 0 XX
Liberalization Ghana 0 XX X
Democracy Ghana 0 X
Opening Vietnam 1
Reform promotion Vietnam 1
Crossroads Vietnam 0 XX
Fireﬁghting Peru 1
Reintegration Peru 0 X
Bureaucratic rule Pakistan 1
Turbulent transition Pakistan 1
Democratic take-oﬀ Pakistan 1
Deadlock Pakistan 0 XX
New momentum Pakistan 1
Crisis management Pakistan 1
Source: Fabricius (1999).34
III. ROOM FOR MANEUVER: THE CHALLENGES FOR ENSURING CONSISTENCY 
The Bank and the Fund have introduced new initiatives over the last decade to promote greater 
cooperation. Such measures have come about largely in response to criticisms over the organizations’ 
handling of the Asian Crisis and increasing calls for the two organizations to strengthen their 
collaboration.33 In a similar vein, the two organizations—in particular, the Fund—had been urged by 
outsiders on various occasions to make their operations more transparent.34 The initiatives’ success of 
ensuring that the two Bretton Woods organizations speak with one voice has been mixed at best. Some 
would even say they have failed.35 As described in the introduction, explicit eﬀorts to improve consistency 
between the two organizations go back 40 years but have typically been informed only by anecdotal 
information and infrequent external assessments rather than empirical data. The following section 
discusses some of these key initiatives for enhanced collaboration in light of the empirical ﬁndings of 
this study, namely the conditions under which the two organizations cooperate. Speciﬁcally, the research 
shows that the mixed outcomes of the initiatives to improve Bank-Fund cooperation may be explained 
by their inadequacies at addressing such fundamental issues as domain consensus and diﬀerences in 
organizational styles. Drawing from the lessons of the study the second half of the section identiﬁes the 
major challenges the Bretton Woods sisters will face and possible approaches they can take to ensure 
greater Bank-Fund consistency. 
Recent Mechanisms of Cooperation 
All Bank-Fund initiatives focused on cooperation were built upon a 1966 agreement that explicitly 
laid out the “primary responsibilities” of each organizations and outlined the procedures for the two to 
work together (Boughton 2001, 997). Since 1966, the Bank and the Fund have reaﬃrmed and adjusted 
these general guidelines, typically following rather publicly failed attempts to see eye-to-eye. Their 
most prominent reaﬃrmation of these principles was the 1989 Concordat on Bank-Fund collaboration 
33. For instance, a group of IMF-commissioned independent experts recommended closer collaboration and clearer delineation 
of responsibilities in areas of overlapping interest like ﬁscal policy (IMF 1998, 58). In the following year, the G-7 Finance 
Ministers “called for an increase in the ‘breadth and pace’ of eﬀorts of collaboration by the Bank and the Fund” to increase 
eﬀective use of resources to “improve the early detection of weaknesses in ﬁnancial systems and crisis response, the design and 
delivery of ﬁnancial sector programs, and technical assistance for member countries” (IMF and World Bank 1999, paragraph 2). 
34. Calls on the Bretton Woods organizations to increase transparency have typically focused on providing access to internal 
documents in a timely fashion, transparency in decision making, and greater external review processes (Kahler 2006, 266). In 
response, both the Bank and the Fund have increased public access to their operational documents. According to a 2005 Fund 
report, it had published 77 percent of Article IV consultations and 58 percent of country staﬀ assessments (IMF 2005, 4). The 
World Bank has also increased information sharing eﬀorts as stipulated in its 2002 Policy on Disclosure of Information (see 
World Bank 2005). However, due to the sensitivity of some of the information contained in Bank and Fund documentation, 
extreme levels of transparency may open countries up to political and macroeconomic vulnerabilities, creating resistance by 
member governments (Kahler 2006, 267). 
35. Edwin Truman (2006b, 16) in his book about strategies for IMF reform states that, “all past eﬀorts [for Bank-Fund 
collaboration] have been halfhearted and failed.” 35
following the organizations’ disagreements over lending operations to Argentina.36 As discussed in the 
introduction, the 1989 Concordat dealt speciﬁcally with the growing tendency of Bank and Fund 
activities to overlap and the subsequent need for clearer delineation of roles and mechanisms for resolving 
conﬂicts between the sister organizations (IMF 1989, paragraph 5). In general, Bank-Fund collaboration 
continues to be guided by this agreement (Boughton 2001, 1004).
The public nature of the two organizations’ disagreement during the Asian Crisis put Bank-Fund 
consistency under greater scrutiny by their stakeholders and ushered in the need for new mechanisms for 
working together. An important advance for promoting interorganizational cooperation was laid out in 
a 1998 joint statement issued by the Bank’s president and the Fund’s managing director on Bank-Fund 
collaboration. In light of the greater overlap in operations, the leaders of the two organizations reaﬃrmed 
that better collaboration was needed and announced three principles to achieve such cooperation. 
First, those involved in country operations should have a clear understanding of each organization’s 
responsibility and the relationships between the two organizations. Second, consultations between the 
staﬀs of the two organizations should begin at an early stage and continue throughout the operational 
cycle “to ensure a coherent approach and reduce redundancy” (IMF and World Bank 2001, iii). Third, 
each organization should be held separately accountable for its own operations (IMF and World Bank 
2001, iii). More generally, the programs of the Bank and the Fund “should be complementary and part of 
an overall reform agenda owned by the member country” (IMF and World Bank 2001, 3). 
Against the background of earlier guidelines on Bank-Fund cooperation, this announcement was 
noteworthy, because it showed that the two organizations were prepared to learn from past collaboration 
eﬀorts, speciﬁcally the less-than-satisfactory PFP process described in section I. The principles announced 
in 1998, then, can be interpreted as an attempt by the Bank and the Fund to rectify the main weaknesses 
of the PFP, namely the asymmetry in the document’s operational importance in each organization, 
the lack of the document’s speciﬁcity in outlining policy targets, and the failure to eﬀectively engage 
the borrowing government in the process. Most notably, this latter weakness with the PFP process 
underscored the need for more substantial country involvement and pushed the Bank and the Fund to 
acknowledge country ownership as an emerging priority of development cooperation. By many standards, 
country ownership had come to be considered an important component of successful poverty reduction 
and development (IMF and World Bank 2001, 2–3). Empirical studies addressing the question of what 
made economic reform programs successful had found government ownership to be one of the key 
factors. For example, in its review of program performance, the Fund’s Policy Development and Review 
Department (PDR) found that “a substantial proportion of program interruptions [had been] attributable 
to policy disagreements between governments and the Fund staﬀ” (IMF 1998, 20–21). Hence, 
36. As Woods (2006, 51) describes, “[t]he rules on collaboration broke down over Argentina in 1988 when the World Bank 
announced a new loan to that country before the IMF mission had completed its negotiations with the Argentine authorities.” As 
Woods suggests, the public nature of this disagreement forced the two organizations to come up with a new agreement to guide 
their collaboration, namely the 1989 Concordat. 36
ownership had come to be considered a necessary condition of successful policy reform and program 
implementation.37
In summary, the announcement of new principles for Bank-Fund collaboration in 1998 served as 
a departure from earlier practices speciﬁcally in addressing weaknesses of past mechanisms for Bank-Fund 
cooperation. However, the principles alone were hardly suﬃcient to lead to changes on the operational 
level. To trigger these changes, the two organizations introduced new processes and procedures which vary 
between diﬀerent groups of countries.
Low-Income Countries 
For low-income countries, cooperation between the Bank and the Fund is carried out through joint 
preparation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).38 The Bank and the Fund established this 
mechanism in 1999 to ensure coordination between the two organizations in light of the inadequacy of 
the PFP and the growing need to coordinate lending to the organizations’ highly indebted clients.39 The 
PRSP was designed to be a comprehensive statement of the borrowing country’s strategy for generating 
sustainable growth and reducing poverty that would guide the Bank’s and the Fund’s operations (IMF and 
World Bank 2001, 7). As shown in box 3, the PRSP approach is to follow several principles and typically 
consists of four core elements, i.e., a description of the country’s participatory process; poverty diagnosis 
and targets; indicators and monitoring systems; and priority public actions. The PRSP not only serves as 
the basis for all lending operations of the Bank and the Fund but also for other organizations.
The process of drafting the PRSP was designed to ensure the consistency of the Bank’s and the 
Fund’s stances by forcing them to develop a common view on the appropriate policy advice for the 
country. The government should prepare the PRSP in consultation with civil society and private sector 
actors in addition to development partners like the Bank and the Fund. The two organizations are 
supposed to meet early in the process and communicate frequently (IMF and World Bank 2001, 7, 9). 
Bank-Fund consistency is to be ensured as follows: Once the PRSP is written, the staﬀs of the Bank 
and the Fund provide a Joint Staﬀ Assessment (JSA) of the country’s strategy and of the adequacy of 
the PRSP as a basis for concesssional lending by the two organizations (IMF and World Bank 2001, 7). 
In developing this joint perspective, the Bank’s and the Fund’s staﬀs operate in close coordination, e.g., 
in joint missions. The Bank and the Fund use the PRSP to determine appropriate instruments and the 
37. The importance of ownership received particular emphasis during the tenure of the IMF’s former managing director, Michel 
Camdessus. In his farewell address, Camdessus went as far as stating that “the IMF’s ultimate objective was country ownership of 
economic reform programs.” He pointed out that “success [of a program] lies in national ‘ownership’ of the policies, through a 
participatory approach that engages civil society in a constructive dialogue” (IMF Survey 29/4, 49–51). 
38. Low-income countries are typically deﬁned by per capita income levels, currently per capita gross national income of $895 
or less according to 2005 World Bank's World Development Indicators. As of August 2006, there were 54 countries qualifying as 
low-income under this deﬁnition (World Bank 2005).
39. The PRSP came out of the enhanced Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC2) initiative launched by the Bretton Woods 
organizations in 1999 to provide debt relief to the poorest countries. As a prerequisite for debt forgiveness and lending, the Bank 
and the Fund are required work with government authorities to develop a PRSP with participation of civil society (Birdsall and 
Williamson 2002, 2). 37
conditions that should be linked to the disbursement of their resources. The staﬀs’ JSA is presented to the 
Bank’s and the Fund’s Board together with the PRSP.
To coordinate their concessional lending to low-income countries, each organization established 
lending facilities and instruments which address policies speciﬁc to their respective core areas of expertise. 
Replacing the ESAF, the Fund introduced a new facility, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
(PRGF), which addresses “monetary, ﬁscal, and exchange rate policies; the institutional arrangements 
underlying these policies; and structural aspects closely related to them, including those in areas of 
overlapping responsibilities, such as the ﬁnancial sector, tax administration, and governance” (IMF and 
World Bank 2001, 8). The Bank, for its part, introduced the Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) 
as a ﬂexible development assistance instrument for low-income countries. The PRSC is based on the 
Box 3    Principles underlying the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) approach
Country-Driven 
• Country ownership of a poverty reduction strategy is paramount. Broad-based participation of civil society in 
the adoption and monitoring of the poverty reduction strategy tailored to country circumstances will enhance 
its sustained implementation.
Results-Oriented 
• An understanding of the nature and determinants of poverty and public actions that can help reduce it is 
required for the formulation of an eﬀective strategy.
• Medium- and long-term goals for poverty reduction, including key outcome and intermediate indicators, are 
needed to ensure that policies are well designed, eﬀectively implemented, and carefully monitored.
Comprehensive 
• Sustained poverty reduction will not be possible without rapid economic growth; macroeconomic stability, 
structural reforms, and social stability are required to move countries to a higher path of sustainable growth.
• Poverty is multidimensional; speciﬁc actions are needed to enable poor people to share in the beneﬁts from 
growth, increase their capabilities and well being, and reduce their vulnerabilities to risks.
• A poverty reduction strategy should integrate institutional, structural, and sectoral interventions into a consistent 
macroeconomic framework.
Partnerships
• Government development of a strategy can provide the context for improved coordination of the work of the 
Bank and the Fund, as well as that of regional development banks and other multilaterals, bilateral assistance 
agencies, NGOs, academia, think tanks, and private sector organizations.
Long-Term Perspective
• A medium- and long-term perspective is needed, recognizing that poverty reduction will require institutional 
changes and capacity building—including eﬀorts to strengthen governance and accountability—and is 
therefore a long-term process.
• National and international partners’ willingness to make medium-term commitments will enhance the 
eﬀectiveness of their support for a poverty reduction strategy.
Source: IMF and World Bank (1999, 6).38
Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), a document the Bank develops in accordance with the PRSP. 
The PRSC principally addresses policies related to the country’s “social, structural, and sectoral policies, 
and of its public expenditure, ﬁnancial management, and procurement systems” (IMF and World Bank 
2001, 8–9). In assessing the borrowing country’s macroeconomic performance, the Bank’s staﬀ draws 
on the Fund’s advice and follows the Fund’s view (IMF and World Bank 2001, 8–9). Conditions tied to 
speciﬁc lending agreements are limited to each organization’s respective core area of expertise.
Middle-Income Countries 
In several ways, the Bank’s and the Fund’s approach towards cooperation in middle-income countries 
resembles their approach towards low-income countries and includes some of the same arrangements.40
The major diﬀerence, however, is that dealings with middle-income countries are not guided by any 
formal process like the PRSP or the related facilities in the two organizations. In other words, there is no 
collaborative vehicle comparable to the PRSP for middle-income countries. Instead, the Bank and the 
Fund rely on their traditional lending instruments.41 As a result, the Bank and the Fund cooperate less 
formally with middle-income countries than with low-income countries.
Consequently, Bank-Fund cooperation vis-à-vis middle-income borrowing countries hinges 
critically on eﬀective communication at the staﬀ level. Since Bank and Fund staﬀs are not required to 
prepare a joint document (like the JSAs for low-income countries), they are expected to develop a common 
understanding and perspective on the basis of various documents. As a result, ensuring consistency is 
even more challenging, as it requires Bank and Fund staﬀ to make extra eﬀorts in order to achieve the 
necessary level of communication. In their guidelines to staﬀ on middle-income countries, the Bank and 
the Fund management point out that while the components needed for a common understanding are 
usually available, they still need to be pieced together. As the Bank and the Fund put it, “in the absence of 
a PRSP-like statement of the country’s program, Bank and Fund staﬀ will need to base their shared view of 
the government’s program on the government’s public statements and their own analysis” (IMF and World 
Bank 2001, 13). However, whereas the building blocks are available, the Bank’s and the Fund’s management 
allow their staﬀs to develop the joint view. From the outside, no speciﬁc process seems to guide Bank and 
Fund staﬀ towards integrating various building blocks into a joint perspective. 
Lead Agency and Joint Operations
Common in both low- and middle-income country dealings, cooperation between the two organizations 
is further guided by a division of labor and, in a few select issue areas, carried out through joint 
40. Middle income is deﬁned by the World Bank as those countries with per capita GNIs from $876 to $10,725 using 2005 
data. As of August 2006, 98 countries ﬁt this category (World Bank 2005).
41. For the Bank, these are structural adjustment loans (SAL) as well as project lending; for the Fund, these are the Fund’s 
traditional short-term lending instruments—in particular, Stand-by Arrangements—as well as its medium-term lending instruments, 
in particular, the Extended Fund Facility (EFF).39
operations. First, the organizations have traditionally aimed for a clear division of labor, where each 
organization focuses on its core area of expertise. The repeated emphasis by Bank and Fund management 
to delineate their respective responsibilities has not only been driven by the goal of ensuring Bank-
Fund consistency through the various arrangements but also for achieving organizational eﬃciency. In 
the words of the two organizations, they intend to “reduc[e] duplication and overlap, develop…more 
systematic procedures, and promot[e] synergies” (IMF and World Bank 2001, 2).42
The “lead agency” concept, originally employed to enable Bank-Fund cooperation on the PRSP 
process, can be interpreted as a device that allows the two organizations to adhere to this principle of 
division of labor: Whenever one of the two organizations has a clear comparative advantage in a speciﬁc 
issue area, it leads designing the policy advice. Furthermore, in situations where neither one of the two 
organizations has a predeﬁned responsibility for the issue area in question, the two organizations must 
determine which one will lead. In order to improve accountability and to increase transparency, Board 
documents are supposed to explicitly cover the work of the respective organization and the responsibilities 
of the lead agency (IMF and World Bank 2001, 6).43
The lead agency concept departs from earlier eﬀorts at delineating the two organizations’ 
responsibilities because of its ﬂexibility. In contrast to earlier agreements, the Bank and the Fund explicitly 
recognize that the exact line of delineation between the two organizations may vary from country to 
country. For that reason, the responsibilities of the two organizations are not deﬁned in general terms, 
but need speciﬁcation in every country setting through the PRSP. Hence, depending on expertise and 
available resources, a given policy area—say, tariﬀ reform—may be addressed by the Fund in one country, 
but by the Bank in another setting. This ﬂexibility is not only aimed at allowing the two organizations 
to respond better to diﬀerent country conditions, but also to avoid duplication of Bank and Fund eﬀorts 
thus protecting the two organizations against turf battles, described earlier as domain dissent.44
Whereas this division of responsibilities provides guidance in most areas, the two organizations 
acknowledge that “the delineation of responsibilities [between the Bank and the Fund] leaves several areas 
of overlap—including elements of ﬁnancial and public sector reform” (IMF and World Bank 2001, 3). 
42. As discussed by Jonathan Bendor (1985, 33–36) such an approach by the two organizations is fully in line with traditional 
thinking on administrative structures which considers it fundamental to avoid any form of redundancy. From this perspective, 
any type of redundancy is wasteful, comparable to friction that interrupts the smooth operations of machines with which 
organizations are often compared. According to Bendor, this view of organizations is remarkable in that it persists and dominates 
the thinking of organizations despite simultaneous adherence to principles of competition in other spheres like business, 
science, or higher education (Bendor 1985, 32). Oﬀering an explanation, Bendor (1985, 284) suggests that there may be 
psychological obstacles to institutionalizing competition in government as the aversion to redundancy may have deep roots in our 
conceptualizations of collective, organized action.
43. The procedures for determining the lead agency in the PRSP process stand out for being highly explicit in terms of the 
nomination of one organization to take the lead and for promoting transparency and accountability in terms of sharing full 
documentation of that organization’s recommendation with the Boards of both organizations. What is not transparent, however 
(at least not to outsiders), is how the two organizations proceed in deciding which one has a comparative advantage in a given 
issue area.
44. Although less explicit, the lead agency concept has been extended to cooperation between the Fund and the Bank in middle-
income countries as evidenced in the 2004 Bank-Fund progress report on collaboration and corresponding case study for 
cooperation between the two organizations in Bulgaria (IMF and World Bank 2004, 15). 40
In the area of ﬁnancial sector reform, the Bank and the Fund have decided to engage in joint operations. 
They imply that the two organizations’ operations are guided by set of speciﬁc procedures that ensure 
close coordination between staﬀ members and joint decision making.45 In order to mitigate conﬂicts and 
to guide collaboration, a Bank-Fund Financial Sector Liaison Committee was set up in 1998 (IMF and 
World Bank 2001, 22). This arrangement can be interpreted as reﬂecting the two organizations’ view 
that in matters of ﬁnancial sector reform, neither one of the two organizations is recognized to have a 
comparative advantage.
For cases in which the combination of division of labor and communication enhancement 
mechanisms fall short of ensuring consistency, the Bank and the Fund have established a mechanism 
through which inconsistencies can be resolved. Originally designed to ensure the eﬀective implementation 
of the PRSP approach, the Bank and Fund management established the Joint Implementation Committee 
(JIC) in 2000. Among other tasks, this committee seeks not only to ensure consistency in application 
of the PRSP process across countries, but also to resolve diﬀerences between Bank and Fund staﬀ views 
that cannot be resolved at the regional and area levels. Issues that the JIC cannot resolve  are reported 
jointly to senior management in both organizations. In 2004, the Bank and the Fund announced an eﬀort 
to strengthen the JIC and expand its mandate to monitor Bank-Fund cooperation in middle-income 
countries. According to the Bank and the Fund, such an initiative would reestablish the JIC as a body to 
facilitate implementation of collaborative agreements between the organizations and “help country teams 
in the two institutions to reach agreement on priorities so as to ensure coherence of policy advice and 
program design” (IMF and World Bank 2004, 27).
Summarizing the collaborative mechanisms the Bank and the Fund have introduced since the 
1989 Concordat, three features need to be highlighted. First, the two organizations have made signiﬁcant 
progress in specifying the procedures to help their staﬀ members to coordinate their activities and to 
ensure that they reach a joint view. In particular, this progress applies to low-income countries where the 
Bank and the Fund have tied their agreement to a speciﬁc document, namely the PRSP. Second, the two 
organizations have introduced an approach that divides responsibilities between themselves according 
to their respective expertise in relation to the borrowing country. Third, the Bank and the Fund have 
come to acknowledge ownership as an important goal of their operations. In what may be a result of 
this emphasis, the two organizations have signiﬁcantly increased the transparency of their operations. 
However, in ensuring consistency, the Bank and the Fund continue to face several challenges.
45.  The two organizations issued guidelines in 1999 for good collaboration over ﬁnancial sector issues with a focus on improving
communication. Correspondingly, these guidelines outline procedures for staﬀ to establish contact lists, share information, 
coordinate work programs, undertake joint missions, provide consistent advice to country authorities, negotiate ﬁnancial sector 
conditions, handle conﬁdential information, and avoid possible conﬂicts of interest related to highly market sensitive information 
(IMF and World Bank 2001, 22–23). The Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) was established in that same year as 
a mechanism through which Bank, Fund, and national authorities collaborated to identify potential vulnerabilities of a given 
country’s ﬁnancial sector and to promote ﬁnancial-sector development (World Bank 2005, 1). 41
Challenges
The ever changing context in which the Bank and Fund operate poses numerous challenges to the 
organizations’ eﬀorts to ensure eﬀective cooperation. Increasing overlap of issue areas for their operations, 
lack of incentive mechanisms for staﬀ cooperation, and increasing importance of country ownership in 
lending agreements can all compromise the Bretton Woods sisters’ ability to work together in a coherent 
manner. The following sections describe these challenges in detail and propose possible avenues for 
overcoming them.
Challenge 1: Division of Labor Is Not Always Feasible
As discussed earlier in the section, the division of labor principle has guided Bank-Fund eﬀorts for 
cooperation throughout the organizations’ histories to reduce overlap and promote consistency. 
However, in practical terms, such division of labor poses its own challenges (two speciﬁcally) to achieving 
consistency between the Fund and the Bank. First, achieving a clear division of labor assumes that each 
organization’s comparative advantage is easy to deﬁne, which is not always the case in overlapping areas. 
The lead agency concept should help in cases of ambiguity by forcing the two organizations to agree on 
which of them has the comparative advantage in a particular area. However, this assumes that whenever 
such ambiguity arises, the two organizations can and will agree. Evidence collected in the course of this 
study’s country research presented in sections I and II shows that this might not always be feasible. As 
shown in table 7, there were numerous instances in which the comparative advantage of each organization 
was not clear. Thus unless the comparative advantage of each organization can be clearly deﬁned, the 
remaining ambiguity can lead to inconsistency. 
Relying on formal divisions of labor to ensure consistency is also problematic because of the 
interdependence between diﬀerent policy variables. Generally, such a division makes the Fund responsible 
for the aggregate management of the economy and the Bank responsible for individual sectors. Such 
a distinction is highly artiﬁcial calling into question the viability of any division of labor. The two 
organizations may take diﬀerent perspectives while they address the same variables. Polak (1997) describes 
this for the example of ﬁscal policy. This case demonstrates the diﬃculty in separating the responsibility 
between the Bank and the Fund and the corresponding limits to any division of labor between the two 
organizations.
Given these challenges, it is not surprising that the various arrangements to promote a division 
of labor between the Bank and the Fund have fallen short of ensuring consistency in all cases. For 
example, various instances of inconsistency occurred in spite of multiple collaborative agreements and 
mechanisms—in particular, the PFP process and the 1989 Concordat. Even in cases where the lead 
agency concept determines comparative advantage, the necessary procedures may not be suﬃciently 42
explicit. Close coordination and communication are still needed to make this concept eﬀective in 
practice.46
Challenge 2: Communication Needs to Be Embedded in Incentives and Behavior
The second challenge the Bank and the Fund face involves the organizational change needed to ensure 
eﬀective communication between the organizations. Processes to guide Bank-Fund cooperation, like the 
PRSP alone, are not enough to ensure consistency. To be eﬀective, such processes need to be enforced, 
monitored, and accompanied by measures that provide incentives to individuals to behave in the desired 
way. Hence, the emphasis on communication as a way to improve Bank-Fund collaboration needs to be 
translated into action on several levels by the organizations’ management. This requirement is particularly 
important in light of the diﬀerences that continue to characterize the Bank’s and the Fund’s operations. In 
particular, diﬀerences in the degree of formality between the Bank and the Fund have been shown to serve 
as barriers to communication. In many ways, the Fund appears to be a more formal organization than 
the Bank in terms of its internal sense of hierarchy, rigorously deﬁned processes, and its compliance with 
them. The Bank’s operations, by contrast, seem to be more ﬂuid and informal.47 Although some progress 
in the Fund’s image has been made in recent years, the diﬀerence in formality was cited by some Bank 
staﬀ in the country research as an explanation for information not being shared. Furthermore, according 
to the external evaluation of the Fund’s high conditionality programs (IMF 1998, 58), “Bank staﬀ 
complain[ed] that while they share their documents readily with their counterparts in the Fund, there is 
too much hierarchy and rigidity in the Fund’s attitude in this regard.”
In addition to formality, each organization places a diﬀerent value on secrecy and conﬁdentiality, 
serving as another potential barrier to eﬀective communication. As has been found in the course of 
country case studies, the perception by a more secretive Fund staﬀ that sharing information with the Bank 
could lead to leakage has occasionally prevented Fund staﬀ from sharing information. 
Given these organizational diﬀerences, the Bank and the Fund continue to face considerable 
challenges to further institutionalizing communication between them. At least until recently, Bank-Fund 
communication continued to hinge on the personalities involved. To change this scenario, the Bank’s and 
the Fund’s senior managers have to tackle nothing short of organizational change. Such a task is both 
multifaceted and multidimensional, requiring a review of key business processes to adjust operational 
guidelines and formulate behavioral incentives. Public announcements suggest that the Bank’s and the 
Fund’s senior management acknowledge the multifaceted dimensions of this task (IMF and World Bank 
46.  It is also worth noting that the potential eﬃciency achieved through recognition and enforcement of division of labor may 
have unwanted implications. For instance, when division of labor reinforces turf sensitivity it can lead to domain dissent and 
subsequently inconsistency.
47. Many observers have characterized this diﬀerence in formality as one between Europe and the United States. In fact, such 
a diﬀerence may be attributed to the inﬂuence European governments—in particular, the French government—have had in 
shaping the Fund. The strong inﬂuence European governments have had on the Fund may explain why the Fund is often 
characterized as a “European organization” whereas the Bank is characterized as an “American organization,” the latter permitting 
more ﬂuidity, mobility, and integration of outsiders.43
2001, 5). It is less clear, though, whether the measures the Bank and the Fund have taken to date reach 
far enough to trigger the intended changes. As Truman (2006b, 16–17) points out, misperceptions and 
mistrust between the two persist:
The Fund is perceived by the Bank as an organization populated by know-it-all elitists, and the 
Bank is perceived by the Fund as an organization populated by uncoordinated do-gooders, each 
with a personal solution to the multiple challenges of development but with no appreciation of 
budget constraints—ﬁnancial, political, or administrative. 
In this context two requirements still need to be met if the level of Bank-Fund communication is to 
correspond to the principles that the Bank’s president and the Fund’s managing director had announced 
in 1998. First, Bank-Fund communication processes need to be better deﬁned for middle-income 
countries. Based on the information presented above, such processes have been more eﬀectively deﬁned 
for low-income countries. Some of the features of the PRSP approach appear to hold great potential 
for institutionalizing Bank-Fund communication in general. Speciﬁcally, these include the detailed 
descriptions of processes; the requirement that the Bank-Fund view must be presented to the Boards in 
speciﬁc documents at predeﬁned levels of detail; and more generally, the high-level transparency that 
characterizes the process. Therefore, to ensure that eﬀective Bank-Fund communication is not conﬁned to 
low-income countries, these more formal features should also be introduced to middle-income countries.
The second requirement is to move beyond merely deﬁning business processes for guiding Bank-
Fund communication to introducing appropriate incentives and monitoring systems to track progress on 
individual staﬀ member compliance. More speciﬁcally, the criteria of staﬀ appraisal and staﬀ promotion 
need to take into consideration the level of Bank-Fund communication.48 In this respect, a range of 
measures typically employed in the private sector could potentially beneﬁt the Bank and the Fund 
in fostering behavioral changes among their staﬀ members. In addition to appraisal procedures, such 
measures include the strengthening of cross-organizational networks and rotation schemes. 
Challenge 3: Minimize Prevailing Diﬀerences in Operational Styles and Models
A third major challenge toward improving Bank-Fund communication and cooperation is the persistent 
and even increasing diﬀerences in the organizations’ operational styles and models. As found in the 
country case studies, the Fund staﬀ was found to become impatient with the slow pace of Bank 
compliance with cooperative arrangements and, in particular, meeting deadlines.49 In trying to make 
up for the Bank’s perceived delay, Fund staﬀ would start carrying out the work itself thus breaking the 
division of labor upon which the two organizations had agreed. The result was duplication of work and 
greater potential for inconsistency. 
48. In this context, input for staﬀ appraisal and staﬀ promotion could also be requested from the other organization.
49. See discussion on operational speeds in section II.44
In addition to speed, the two organizations’ diﬀerent operational models pose an added challenge 
to eﬀorts for ensuring consistency. The Bank has gradually decentralized its operations over the past two 
decades, transferring a signiﬁcant share of its country operations to the capitals of its member countries.50
The Fund, in contrast, remains a rather centralized organization and continues to operate primarily out 
of Washington. As a result, the Bank’s and the Fund’s resident missions have come to play diﬀerent roles 
within each of the two organizations. In the Bank’s structure, resident missions have grown in size and 
in decision-making power.51 Consequently, being posted to a resident mission has become increasingly 
important in the typical career paths of the Bank’s professional staﬀ. By contrast, the Fund’s resident 
representatives continue to play a rather marginal role in the Fund’s operations. Oﬃcially, the Fund’s 
resident representative establishes relationships with the Fund’s key counterparts in the government but 
operations are largely driven from Washington.52
Overcoming such barriers to Bank-Fund cooperation in light of persistent and increasing 
operational diﬀerences will require greater eﬀorts and resources to ensure consistency. Established 
collaborative mechanisms may not be enough. The concept of creating joint missions the kind of creative 
approach needed to overcome diﬀerences in organization models, as it helps equalize representation 
by both organizations in the borrowing country’s capital. The implication of taking such measures is 
that unless top management dedicates the required level of attention and resources, the collaborative 
mechanisms fall short of ensuring the level of communication that is needed to ensure Bank-Fund 
consistency.
Challenge 4: Requirement of Ownership Redeﬁnes the Game
The recent emphasis placed on borrowing country ownership by both the Bank and the Fund represents a 
fourth major challenge to promoting consistency. While it is not entirely clear what measures are needed 
to achieve greater ownership, some guidelines do exist.53 The challenge in building ownership lies in 
ﬁnding a middle ground between donor requirements and policy measures that garner support within 
the borrowing country’s society. If borrowing governments are forced to carry out policy reforms that do 
not resonate with their own national priorities and garner support from key constituents, implementation 
will be undermined. Promoting greater ownership, then, requires more ﬂexible approaches to negotiations 
that respond to the preferences borrowing governments express during the course of discussions. Doing 
so means that the Bank and the Fund need to approach negotiations in the spirit of partnership, spending 
50. For example, this was found in one of the country case studies: In Vietnam such decentralization translated to the Bank’s 
country operations manager moving from Washington to Hanoi in 1997 (Fabricius 1999, 284–311). 
51. The number of professional staﬀ includes both local staﬀ and staﬀ sent from headquarters.
52.  The external ESAF program evaluation conﬁrms that Fund resident missions tend to be very small and their staﬀ are 
not central to the organization’s operations. According to the report, some Fund resident representatives “expressed concern 
about the career advancement possibilities following their postings. [The] general impression is that the role of the resident 
representative is perhaps not being maximized enough” (IMF 1998, 57).
53. The World Bank’s guidelines and operational tool kits elaborated under the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) 
is one such example (World Bank 2004). 45
more time consulting government authorities and stakeholders and yielding some control over policy 
choices that traditionally has characterized their position. 
Against this background, both the Bank and the Fund have instituted mechanisms in recent years 
to enhance ownership not only to further engage national authorities but to make governments consult 
more with their own populations. Not surprisingly, the Bank, however, appears to have advanced further 
in promoting ownership than the Fund. The organization has made ownership one of the four main 
priorities of its Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) for working with countries on policy 
reform and development initiatives. Staﬀ guidelines and country tool kits help to operationalize this goal 
(Handoussa and Lancaster 2005). The Bank’s ability to promote country ownership may be due to the 
organization’s relative ﬂexibility in developing policy proposals. In contrast to the Fund which, at times, 
arrived in a country with a set agenda and policy proposal,54 the Bank makes an eﬀort during the early 
stages of negotiation to consider diﬀerent possible packages together with the borrowing government (van 
der Geest 1994, 190).55
The distinct levels of institutional ﬂexibility and corresponding diﬀerent paces of adjustment to 
foster country ownership within their operations seem to have contributed to the asymmetry in the 
triangular relationship between the Bank, the Fund, and the borrowing country. In many borrowing 
countries, it seems, the Bank developed a set of relationships with a broad range of counterparts—the 
Fund, by contrast, appears to remain at arm’s length.  Without more substantial eﬀorts and resources, this 
asymmetry will make Bank-Fund cooperation more diﬃcult to achieve. 
Conclusion
Though recent eﬀorts to strengthen Bank-Fund collaboration have generated progress on certain fronts, 
signiﬁcant challenges remain. Some of these challenges—notably, the diﬀerences in operational styles and 
the limits inherent to trying to divide responsibilities between increasingly overlapping organizations—
have been persistent across numerous attempts at promoting consistency. Other challenges, however, have 
emerged only recently like the increasing divergence of the two organizations’ operational models. As a 
result, communication between the two organizations becomes increasingly costly. 
Hence, the Bank’s and the Fund’s ability to ensure consistency hinges on top management’s strong 
commitment to taking action on the three priority areas discussed above: deﬁning processes for guiding 
Bank-Fund dealings with middle-income countries, creating incentives for staﬀ in both organizations to 
engage in communication, and formulating arrangements to bridge the diﬀerences in operational styles. 
54. As pointed out in the evaluation of ESAF programs, Fund staﬀ was often found “to [come] to negotiations with ﬁxed 
positions so that agreement was usually only possible through compromises in which the country negotiating teams moved to the 
Fund’s positions” (IMF 1998, 36).
55. In a 2004 progress report on Bank-Fund collaboration, a survey to authorities of borrowing governments conﬁrmed this 
perceived diﬀerence in ﬂexibility: “[W]hereas 20 percent of the respondents believe that the Bank is very ﬂexible in program 
design, the corresponding ﬁgure for the Fund is only 11 percent.” This diﬀerence was also observed within the organizations 
themselves: “Almost 90 percent of Fund staﬀ responses indicate that they consider the World Bank to be rather or very ﬂexible in
discussions with authorities and donors, but less than 75 percent of the Bank respondents consider Fund staﬀ to be rather or very
ﬂexible” (IMF and World Bank 2004, 13).46
However, commitment at the top is not enough. Such institutional change also needs to be managed at 
multiple levels to bring all staﬀ on-board. Deﬁning cross-functional coordination mechanisms, measuring 
performance needs, and triggering cultural adjustments are ways to do so. To make this happen, the Bank 
and the Fund may beneﬁt from some private-sector tools.
The greater challenge, however, is how the increasing importance of ownership is redeﬁning the 
traditional roles of external donors in general and the Bank and the Fund in particular. As the Bank and 
the Fund move from imposing what some borrowing countries referred to as a “straightjacket” of policy 
prescriptions to a greater emphasis on partnership and dialogue, the organizations need to operate in a 
diﬀerent mode than in the past. From the Bank’s and the Fund’s perspective, the increasing importance 
of ownership requires yielding some of their authority in deﬁning policy measures. The Bank’s and the 
Fund’s ability to engage government authorities and other stakeholders in a process of policy development 
that generates proposals with broad societal support will make them successful in this endeavor. Hence, 
the process of deﬁning policy measures will need to be longer and more interactive. Regarding Bank-
Fund consistency, the increasing importance of ownership raises the question of whether Bank-Fund 
consistency as a goal is as relevant it was in the past. The next section addresses this question.47
Table 7   Overview of policy areas with ambiguous comparative advantage
Issue area Issue Episode Country U
Aid Democracy Ghana 0
Crossroads Vietnam 0
Cocoa Turnaround Ghana 0
Rehabilitation Ghana 0
Liberalization Ghana 0
Financial sector Crossroads Vietnam 0
Treasury Bill Deadlock Pakistan 0
Fiscal Wage increase Ambiguity Ghana 0
Civil service reform Liberalization Ghana 1
VAT Democracy Ghana 0
Tax Reintegration Peru 0
Turbulent transition Pakistan 0
Macro    Ambiguity Ghana 0
Liberalization Ghana 0
Opening Vietnam 0
Reform promotion Vietnam 0
Fireﬁghting Peru 0
Privatization Liberalization Ghana 1




Trade Ambiguity Ghana 0
Reform promotion Vietnam 0
New momentum Pakistan 0
Regulation duty Crisis management Pakistan 0
U = Ambiguous comparative advantage
0 = There is no consensus on which organization would be best prepared to address the speciﬁc issue.
1 = IMF, World Bank, and government agree on which organization is best prepared to address
        the speciﬁc issue.
Source: Fabricius (1999).48
IV.  TAKING A STEP BACK: IS BANKFUND CONSISTENCY ALWAYS DESIRABLE?
The previous sections present empirical data to test whether and through what mechanisms the World 
Bank and the IMF are found to adopt consistent policy stances vis-à-vis borrowing governments. The 
analysis is carried further by highlighting challenges to consistency and proposals to guide Bank and 
Fund management to overcome them. However, as will be developed in this section, consistency may 
not always be desirable. Given the changing environment for policy lending which emphasizes local 
governance and ownership, there is a higher premium on understanding country-speciﬁc factors to make 
more informed and more successful policy recommendations. This development has speciﬁc implications 
for the operations of each of the two organizations. 
Recent evidence from the Asian Crisis and overall criticisms of policy mistakes committed by 
the Bank and the Fund show that within the current context and considering current operations, the 
two organizations may be prone to committing errors in their policy advice to borrowing governments. 
Furthermore, given the emerging consensus about new “keys to success” for policy reform processes (i.e., 
promoting country ownership and country buy-in on reform priorities), new operational arrangements 
within the Fund and the Bank may be required. The following section presents two proposals: First, in 
particular cases where stakes are high regarding potential policy errors, redundancy between the two 
organizations and/or with third party “experts” may be warranted. In other cases where close interaction 
on the country level is crucial to developing good policy recommendations, division of labor between the 
two organizations should be further strengthening leading the Bank to exercise a more prominent role 
than the Fund in the majority of policy-based lending operations. 
Striving for Consistency
Looking back, the Bank’s and the Fund’s emphasis on speaking with one voice has been based on a series 
of assumptions. First individual economic policy measures need to be consistent and complementary 
if they are to be eﬀective and credible. Otherwise, individual measures will fail to trigger the intended 
responses on savers and investors. Second the need to limit the resource demands on the borrowing 
governments is another reason to speak with one voice. Designing an economic program usually requires 
signiﬁcant contributions from individuals who possess substantial analytic and managerial skills. In 
many borrowing governments, only a few key individuals may possess such abilities and place a high 
premium on their time. As a result, the Bank and the Fund have an incentive to enter into negotiations 
with borrowing governments sharing one consistent view. Third speaking with one voice allows the Bank 
and the Fund to enhance their negotiating position vis-à-vis the government. As discussed in section II, 
evidence from the country case studies shows that borrowing governments were often able to exploit even 
small diﬀerences of opinion between the two Bretton Woods sisters by playing them against each other. 
The problem with these assumptions is that they are based on one speciﬁc view of the relationship 
between international ﬁnancial organizations (IFOs) and borrowing governments. It is a relationship 
characterized by potential antagonism and the possible need to impose strict conditionalities. 49
Traditionally, in such a scenario, the Bank and the Fund have often found themselves in a quasi-
monopolistic position in terms of providing policy advice to their member countries. The rather extensive 
modeling that develops informed policy recommendations typically requires complex data and inputs. 
Borrowing countries have often lacked the resources and technical capacity to develop their own proposals 
or adequately counter Bank and Fund recommendations, at least at the level of technical sophistication 
that characterizes the Bank’s and the Fund’s approaches.56
This traditional view is very diﬀerent from the one embodied by an emerging consensus that a 
partner-like relationship needs to exist between IFOs and borrowing governments. This new kind of 
relationship requires that IFOs possess in-depth, country-speciﬁc knowledge and promote ownership 
and institution building in order to formulate sound policy recommendations. Therefore, while it is true 
that the Bank and the Fund have an impressive range of resources and assets on which they can draw 
(i.e., privileged access to member countries governments, a pool of experiences from across the globe, 
and a high concentration of expertise), other forms of knowledge and inputs are increasingly needed to 
formulate policy recommendations. As a result, current forms of collaboration that strive for consistency 
may actually undermine the Bank’s and the Fund’s ability to achieve their ultimate goals of equitable 
growth and economic stability.
Emerging Requirements 
As mentioned above, recent experiences have highlighted weaknesses in the Bank’s and the Fund’s ability 
to produce sound policy advice. These cases shed light on emerging requirements and success factors to 
achieve what are now a broader set of goals for policy lending. Namely, two key lessons have emerged. 
First, the Bretton Woods sisters face a greater “risk of errors” in terms of policy advice and, second, they run 
the “risk of oversight” of key factors that need to be addressed to promote ownership and country-speciﬁc 
recommendations.
Risk of Errors
The ﬁrst lesson refers to the fact that the Fund and the Bank have made errors in their policy advice 
to borrowing countries. Such errors could have been due to ﬂawed analytical frameworks, missing 
information, or selectivity bias which led the Bank and the Fund to miss some important inputs to 
their recommendations and corresponding conditionalities. The Asian Crisis provides perhaps the most 
publicly scrutinized example of such errors and raises the question of whether the operational rigidities 
within the organizations have increased the risk of errors and raised the stakes in terms of legitimacy 
when errors occur. Descriptions of the crisis point to the organizations’ failure to collect and use the 
56. The Bank and the Fund’s self-identiﬁcation as “technical organizations” guided by rational criteria deserves special mention. 
Whereas this technocratic mindset is powerful in framing problems and providing a methodology to tackle speciﬁc tasks, its 
downside is that some aspects are explicitly ignored giving the organizations only a partial view of a given issue or problem. As 
Centeno (1993, 311) points out, political aspects are typically overlooked in a technocratic approach. 50
most relevant information needed to inform their policy recommendations. Critiques of the Fund, in 
particular, are numerous. In Martin Feldstein’s description of the Fund’s role in the Asian Crisis, he argues 
that it followed some ﬂawed analysis resulting in inappropriate recommendations: 
Unfortunately, the International Monetary Fund seized on the troubles in the region as an 
opportunity to insist on fundamental structural reforms. . . . Attempting to force such fundamental 
reforms was both counterproductive and inappropriate for the IMF.57
In a similar vein, Jeﬀrey Sachs criticized the program the Fund designed for Korea in 1997 as a 
“draconian programme. . .[thrown] together in just a few days without deep knowledge of the country’s 
ﬁnancial system and without any subtlety as to how to approach the problems.”58
The two organizations acknowledged that they made mistakes in their policy recommendations, 
but the level of responsibility each assumed diﬀered. Oﬃcially, the Fund showed reluctance to admit any 
errors in its advice and instead pointed the ﬁnger at governments. The Fund’s then Managing Director 
argued that it was unable to persuade the aﬀected governments to act sooner when it saw trouble coming 
“because they were in denial about the problems.”59 He also blamed the “hugely unreliable” economic 
data the Fund had received from governments as another culprit.60 According to one commentator, 
“on the biggest issue it [the Fund] comes to the happy conclusion that it was right all along. The policy 
failures were mainly of implementation (not its fault) rather than design.”61 The Bank, on the other 
hand, was more willing to admit its mistakes in the Asian Crisis. Reviewing its performance the Bank 
acknowledged that its analysis of the situation had suﬀered from some serious ﬂaws. In an evaluation 
of its operations in Indonesia the Bank concluded that its oﬃcials “ignored corruption, growing 
repression, and a collapsing ﬁnancial system in the ﬁnal years of President Suharto’s 33-year rule.”62
In a tone of remarkable frankness, the Bank acknowledged that in their dealings with the Indonesian 
government, senior Bank oﬃcials “did not want to oﬀend Mr. Suharto’s government or threaten the 
image the World Bank had promoted of Indonesia as one of its great success stories.”63 Besides the Asian 
Crisis, there are other instances where the Bank and Fund have been criticized for errors in their policy 
recommendations.64
57. Financial Times, March 5, 1998.
58. Financial Times, December 11, 1997.
59. Financial Times, February 9, 1998.
60. Financial Times, February 9, 1998.
61. International Herald Tribune, January 21, 1999. Compared with the Fund’s oﬃcial response, some individual staﬀ members 
acknowledged some shortcomings in the Fund’s analysis and the design of its policy recommendations. For example, a member 
of the Fund’s staﬀ was quoted as conceding that the Fund “had made some judgments ‘too quickly’ and mistakenly thought it 
was simply seeing a repeat of past currency crises” (International Herald Tribune, December 3, 1998). To the best of the author’s 
knowledge, admissions of this nature never entered the Fund’s oﬃcial view. 
62. New York Times, February, 11 1999.
63. New York Times, February 11, 1999.
64. For example, Jeﬀrey Sachs in a December 11, 1997, Financial Times article listed several of the Fund’s policy 
recommendations which he disagreed with, namely mishandling reforms in the Soviet Union by imposing a common currency 51
While the Fund’s and Bank’s errors were highly scrutinized in the public arena, they are not all 
that surprising to those who study organizations. Such errors in decision making are not uncommon and 
are often caused by the organizations’ limited capacity to fully absorb the complexity of their respective 
environments. As Simon’s theory of bounded rationality explains, organizations often use shortcuts 
and speciﬁc technical vocabulary to facilitate communication internally. They also typically follow a 
common set of assumptions and concepts for selecting information to help them translate complex 
reality into more readily processed patterns. However, such selectivity in absorbing information can also 
increase the risk of errors, since organizations will screen out some parts of reality that do not ﬁt into the 
particular concepts applied to select information. According to March and Simon, for an organization, 
“the particular categories and schemes of classiﬁcation it employs are reiﬁed, and become, for members 
of the organization, attributes to the world rather than mere conventions” (March and Simon 1958, 
165, quoted in Perrow 1986, 125). In this context, individuals within the organization may attempt to 
be rational, but due to the proverbial blinders they put on, they are only “intendedly rational.” Using 
Simon’s terminology, they are “bounded” in their rationality by the limits that internal divisions of labor, 
communication systems, standard practices, authority systems, training, and indoctrination can cause. 
As the combined behavior of individuals determines the overall performance of the organization, the 
organization as a whole is therefore “bounded” or limited. 
For both the Bank and the Fund, some evidence exists to support the argument that the two 
organizations exhibit bounded rationality due in large part to organizational rigidities. In the case of 
the World Bank, Leﬀ (1988) found Bank staﬀ reluctant to employ a new method for social cost-beneﬁt 
analysis not only due to operational diﬃculties (e.g., the data requirements of the new approach), but also 
because the new approach conﬂicted with the Bank’s internal incentive system (Leﬀ 1988, 80–81). Signs 
of operational rigidities have also been observed in the Fund. In his critique of the Fund’s operations in 
the Asian Crisis, Joseph Stiglitz (2000, 17–18) points out: 
The mathematical models the IMF uses are frequently ﬂawed or out-of-date. Critics accuse 
the institution of taking a cookie-cutter approach to economics, and they are right. . . . Time 
and again, I was dismayed at how out-of-date and how out-of-tune with reality the models 
Washington economists employed were.65
prematurely, “thereby delaying stabilization and undermining the political support for reforms.” He also criticized the Fund’s 
overoptimistic, inaccurate reading of economic variables in Bulgaria contributing to the collapse in that country’s GDP and rapid 
inﬂation as well as the Fund’s failure to anticipate the Mexican and Asian crises.
65. Besides organizational rigidities, the risk of errors by the Bank and the Fund stems from at least two additional sources. 
First, staﬀ members of both organizations must often work with assumptions and estimations given the scarcity and sometimes 
questionable quality of data. Doing so leaves room for ambiguity that makes individuals rely on judgment that can lead to 
diﬀerent and potentially ﬂawed policy recommendations. Second, the Bank and Fund face a trade-oﬀ between operational 
eﬃciency and the ﬂexibility needed to collect and analyze relevant information given strict deadlines and operational standards 
under which they work. The Fund, in particular, tends to emphasize operational eﬃciency often precluding its staﬀ from 
taking the time to conduct quality controls and consistency checks. As described by Richard Harper (1998, 176), “the broad 
set of skills and techniques used on missions enable the economists to produce a staﬀ report come what may, i.e. irrespective of 
the incompleteness of the data they have access to and disregarding (more or less) any contingencies they have to deal with” 
(emphasis in original). 52
As described above, recent experiences (in particular, in the context of the Asian Crisis) have shown 
that the Bank’s and the Fund’s ability to deliver good policy advice has not gone unquestioned implying 
a greater (or at least more costly) risk of errors. Given the prominent role the Bank and the Fund play 
in many borrowing countries and the quasi-monopolistic position in which the representatives of the 
two organizations sometimes ﬁnd themselves, this possibility is problematic both from the country’s 
standpoint and in terms of legitimacy of the Bretton Woods sisters. In many countries, the Bank’s and 
the Fund’s recommendations have far-reaching implications, making it all the more important for the 
organizations to develop mechanisms that may reduce the risk of errors. To date, such measures remain 
largely ignored. An important question, then, is which measures, particularly in terms of operational 
design, should be taken in order to reduce the risk of errors in Bank and Fund policy advice.
Risk of Oversight
In light of an emerging consensus that successful policy reforms are those that resonate in the borrowing 
country and match borrowing government’s priorities, it has become more important that the Bank and 
the Fund anchor their analytic work in a broad understanding of the country. As stated in the World 
Bank’s CDF staﬀ guide, “[d]evelopment eﬀectiveness is. . .seriously diminished by failure to tap into local 
knowledge required for designing and implementing development programs” (World Bank 2004, 14). 
Therefore, the Bank and the Fund run the risk of overlooking key elements that are crucial to developing 
appropriate, informed, and feasible policy recommendations. A general lesson to be drawn from 
development work in the past is that standardized approaches to support individual countries have turned 
out to be limited. 
As Birdsall and Kapur et al. (2005, ix) describe for the Bank: “‘[L]everage’ cannot rely on the 
detailed conditionality of a ‘nanny bank,’ it must rely on Bank staﬀ being politically savvy—sensitive 
to a country’s political constraints. . . . That implies a premium on systematic analysis of local politics 
and institutions—and on increasing Bank-wide research and analysis of country governance.” Both 
organizations have a mixed record in grounding their recommendations in solid country knowledge. The 
broader development goals of the Bank’s mandate, namely an emphasis on poverty reduction, make such 
an approach more relevant to the Bank than the Fund. Yet, the eﬀectiveness of the Bank’s operations, 
particularly in low-income countries, remains questionable due to a persistent impression that policies 
are still handed down to countries who also then ﬁnd great diﬃculty in “graduating” from highly 
concessional lending agreements (Birdsall and Kapur et al. 2005, 14). 
Given the mixed success of high conditionality lending for both the Fund and the Bank, the 
hard lesson to learn has been that no one size ﬁts all. As Birdsall and Kapur et al. (2005, 3) state, “the 
development community has learned that no single recipe or set of priorities to achieve poverty-reducing 
growth can be applied across countries.” The implications of this growing need to deeply understand the 
political anatomy of borrowing countries and local governance issues means that development priorities 
need to be designed on a country-by-country basis and regularly revised. Such a requirement translates 53
into new operational needs that diﬀer from traditional mechanisms designed to enhance cooperation and 
consistency between the Bank and the Fund. The following section proposes two changes to operational 
procedures within and between the organizations to minimize the risks discussed above. 
Proposal 1: Operational Diﬀerentiation and Redundancy
The Fund and the Bank both aim to develop the best possible policy recommendations based on clearly 
deﬁned goals, appropriate analytic frameworks, and complete information entering the models as input. 
Reducing the risk of errors requires that the two organizations use the best expertise available. Given 
the organizational rigidities and corresponding biases described earlier, one possible approach to do so 
involves further diﬀerentiation of operational procedures in the decision-making processes of the Bank 
and the Fund and/or with outside organizations. The Bank or Fund should integrate outside expertise 
either from its sister organization, the academic community, or governments. A series of procedures can 
use these forms of outside expertise. 
Traditionally, outside expertise entered the Bank’s and the Fund’s decision-making processes by 
hiring outside experts as consultants or otherwise integrating them into the internal operations. This 
practice may provide the two organizations with legitimacy vis-à-vis the outside world. However, given 
the existing internal review processes within the organizations, the independent nature of this expertise 
can be dampened by organizational biases, diminishing its impact to reduce policy errors.66 To avoid this 
possibility and still introduce outside expertise into decision-making processes, one viable operational 
approach is to set up redundant operations. The principle of redundancy is rather straightforward and 
commonly employed in various industries, most notably in engineering (Bendor 1985, 26–27): Instead of 
developing something in one single channel, several channels are employed in parallel. The risk of errors, 
then, does not depend on any single channel, but on the number of parallel processes, thus allowing 
organizations to overcome the fallibility of their individual parts. In other words, some duplication can 
provide a measure of reliability: When one agency fails, a second one may succeed (Bendor 1985, 2). 
In terms of Bank and Fund operations, establishing functionally equivalent (i.e., redundant) 
channels of communication and decision making between the two organizations or a third party can 
provide a degree of reliability that a single channel (or decision-making process) could rarely attain.67
Speciﬁcally, redundancy helps reduce the risk of error by increasing the level of scrutiny that individuals 
apply in working on a speciﬁc problem. In redundant processes, the results generated by diﬀerent 
channels are compared and diﬀerences need to be explained. Doing so leads to a deeper analysis of the 
assumptions, data, and methodology employed and helps test the robustness of the results. Drawing on 
a standard set of techniques, these ﬁndings can then be reconciled and translated into a range of action. 
66. Both organizations—the Fund, in particular—pride themselves as having extensive internal review processes to ensure the 
quality of their advice; however, these review processes may fall short of correcting organizational biases. 
67. It is also worth noting that such a proposal is not inconsistent with the overall agreements between the Bank and the Fund 
about collaboration: The 1989 Concordat does not preclude the two organizations from carrying out their own analysis and even 
points out that the member governments could beneﬁt from having diﬀerent perspectives presented (Boughton 2001, 1059).54
Furthermore, the element of competition introduced through redundancy will also help reduce the risk 
of errors: The very prospect of anticipating the comparison with other channels, it is argued, will have 
a positive eﬀect on the commitment of individuals. Hence, the quality of a team’s output is expected 
to improve when working in parallel with another team assigned to the same task than working alone. 
Therefore, the concept of redundancy connotes a conscious striving of each channel to generate 
superior results. 
Of course, introducing redundant operations has certain implications that make it more or less 
desirable as a strategy for reducing errors. As described by Jonathan Bendor (1985, 55) four criteria 
help determine whether redundancy is preferable to single-channel operations in a given situation: 
First redundancy becomes more desirable when the probability of failure in a single channel of 
action, communication, or decision making is higher. Second redundancy is more desirable when the 
implications of failure would be critical or very costly. Third redundancy is more desirable when the 
chance that a duplicate agency could discover a superior way to attain the same result that a monopolistic 
agency achieves is more signiﬁcant. Fourth redundancy is more desirable when the costs associated 
with it are lower. Additional costs of redundancy include those costs resulting from the higher degree of 
complexity in the decision-making process. 
Despite the Bank’s and the Fund’s tendency to try to reduce overlap and avoid duplication, 
these criteria highlight that in some cases, redundant operations may be warranted for certain areas 
of the Bank’s and the Fund’s operations. In particular, this would apply when the cost of failure 
would be exceptionally high, like in macroeconomic policy. For instance, if the Fund were developing 
policy recommendations with regard to tax policy in a given country that is closely related to both 
macroeconomic policy and sectoral policy, the Bank may have suﬃcient expertise in that area and 
country to be invited by the Fund to develop its own proposal and compare the ﬁnal results of each 
organization. The decision of whether to introduce redundancy depends on whether the policy question 
justiﬁes including outside expertise in the ﬁrst place and, if so, whether redundancy is warranted over 
incorporation of outside experts’ advice within internal processes. 
Whereas redundancy between the Bank and the Fund oﬀers a way to reduce errors, it also has 
signiﬁcant limitations. The potential value of redundancy increases with the diﬀerence between each of 
the channels. The similarity between the two organizations in terms staﬀ members’ educational biases, 
headquarters’ location, and distance from their member countries would lead the potential errors of the 
two organizations to be highly correlated.68 These similarities call into question whether one of the two 
organizations could be expected to generate results that would be not only diﬀerent, but also superior 
to the one developed by the other organization. Therefore, the best expertise might lie outside both 
organizations, requiring the Bretton Woods sisters to look beyond 19th Street.
One possible avenue would be to call upon borrowing governments to become a new, independent 
68. Homogeneity of this kind has been known to be one of the knottiest problems in the pragmatics of redundancy because 
it militates against genuine diversity in intellectual perspectives and methods (Bendor 1985, 39, 282). Doubts about the 
independence of diﬀerent channels have been one of the key arguments against redundancy. 55
decision-making channel for developing policy recommendations. Such an approach diﬀers substantially 
from the traditional “policy dialogue,” which periodically incorporates government input, yet tends to 
limit the degree to which governments can really put forth their ideas.69 Yet for borrowing governments to 
be eﬀective as separate channels redundant operations, they need to fulﬁll two criteria. First government 
staﬀ members need to demonstrate a high level of technical expertise, suﬃcient enough to develop 
policy proposals of the same technical caliber as those produced by the Bank and the Fund. Second 
the government needs to agree with the general course of policy change that the Bank and the Fund 
advocate. If these conditions are not met, the policy proposals developed by the government would not 
have the technical weight or basic elements to be considered by the Bretton Woods sisters as comparable 
alternatives to their own. If the governments lack suﬃcient technical expertise, they may be consulted, 
but will not be in a position to prepare their own policy proposals. If the governments do not agree with 
the policy change, their proposals may be discounted or negotiations could even become adversarial. If, 
however, both criteria are met, redundancy that incorporates the borrowing government can serve not 
only as a strategy for reducing errors but for promoting country ownership of policy reform processes and 
building technical capacity among governments. 
Besides governments, other channels outside the Bank, the Fund, or the borrowing government 
could be considered for developing policy recommendations. For example, expert groups made up 
of economists or other specialists in the borrowing country or, alternatively, individuals from an 
international pool of recognized experts could comprise a channel parallel to the Bank and the Fund. 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, redundancy has not been exploited by the Bretton Woods 
sisters. Instead, as discussed in section III, eﬀorts aimed at improving policy recommendations in certain 
areas where both organizations have expertise (i.e., ﬁnancial sector policy) has moved towards joint 
operations. While joint operations may force the two organizations to speak with one voice, they do not 
necessarily reduce the risk of mistakes in policy recommendations. Since the diﬀerent channels are not 
independent from one another, errors in one channel will also aﬀect the other channel. 
Given the Bank’s and the Fund’s current operations, introducing the principle of redundancy would 
require them to make considerable changes. In practice, this would require a redesign of the Bank’s and 
the Fund’s business processes, particularly with respect to both low-income and middle-income countries. 
Although a detailed description of such operational changes goes beyond the scope of this work, the 
two organizations would ﬁrst need to create a procedure for deciding whether to continue as single- or 
multiple-channel operations. Depending on the outcome of this decision, some operational requirements 
would need to be deﬁned, like creating a staﬀ structure to select the appropriate channel, coordinate the 
parallel processes, synchronize the procedures, and ensure the channels work with the same data. 
69. In recent years this policy dialogue approach has been enhanced and formalized, particularly through mechanisms like the 
PRSP in low-income countries and joint engagement in the Bank’s Analytic and Advisory Services (World Bank 2004, 22). 
Nevertheless, as pointed out by Birdsall and Kapur et al. (2005, 14), there is a persistent view that “Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers still reﬂect country’s expectation of what the Bank wants more than their own priorities.” 56
Redundant processes would also require a review mechanism or a point of reconciliation to evaluate the 
results of both channels. 
There are important implications that arise if the Bank and Fund were to shift away from their 
traditional division of labor and “policy dialogue” frameworks and incorporate redundancy in their 
operations. Such a change would lead to diﬀerentiation in the way policy recommendations and 
corresponding conditions would be developed: Some policy recommendations would be deﬁned within 
the Bank or the Fund; others would be made by integrating outside experts into internal processes. 
Other recommendations—presumably the most critical ones—would be made following a more 
elaborate process of redundancy. So, depending on the scenario, the Bank and the Fund would not (and 
should not) necessarily speak with one voice, thus running counter to traditional approaches to achieve 
consistency. Instead, redundancy provides a new way to improve policy recommendations by reducing 
errors and even increasing country ownership in cases where governments exhibit suﬃcient technical 
capacity to be considered as a separate channel. Introducing redundancy can also reinforce the shift 
towards a more partner-like relationship between IFOs and borrowing governments characterized by an 
integrated decision-making process. For example, decision-making processes with the government will, to 
some extent, be congruent and identical with decision-making processes within the Bank and the Fund.
The negative implications of introducing redundancy include costs associated with operational 
changes and potentially reduced eﬃciency through duplication and additional time needed to compare 
results. Additional time could be minimized in light of the impressive possibilities of teams working at 
diﬀerent locations through web-based platforms.70 Furthermore, such costs could be justiﬁed given the 
far-reaching implications and high cost of errors that the Bank’s and the Fund’s policy recommendations 
have for borrowing countries. That said, additional time requirements mean that situations where 
decisions have to be made quickly, as in crisis situations, would not be suited for redundancy. In such 
cases, a feasible course of action would consist of engaging in some form of joint operations: Whereas 
one organization would be in charge of devising the policy recommendation to be presented to the 
government, ways could be found to ensure that the other organization’s expertise on the given subject 
matter would be taken into account. 
Proposal 2: Strengthen Division of Labor Within New Lending Environment 
As described above, the emerging requirements for successful policy lending (i.e., attention to governance, 
buy-in, and ownership), carry with them a greater risk that the Bank and/or the Fund overlook key 
components to a more country-focused process of developing policy recommendations. In light of this 
“risk of oversight,” a complementary approach should be taken in policy areas that are more closely related 
to matters of development: The two organizations should move towards a stronger division of labor 
70. It should be noted that while additional costs may be associated with introducing redundancy, redundancy is not necessarily
ineﬃcient. As described by Bendor (1985, 31) there is no evidence conﬁrming that redundancy is wasteful—instead, there is 
some evidence that organizational reform along the classical lines of organization theory to reduce overlap does not lead to high
savings.57
with reduced overlap. In this scenario, the Bank should be responsible for matters of middle- to long-
term lending operations to both low- and middle-income countries. The Fund should rely on the Bank’s 
expertise in matters relating to development lending and focus its resources on its core responsibilities 
of macroeconomic and ﬁnancial sector matters. This proposal will help further reduce overlap between 
the two organizations and beneﬁt from the Bank’s comparative advantage in middle-term lending 
arrangements.
Overlap of activities has been a persistent problem for the Bretton Woods sisters. The results of 
the study presented in sections I and II, though dated, demonstrate this empirically: Domain dissent 
prevented the two organizations from cooperating even in cases where consistency was desired by both. 
Overlapping activities between the Bank and the Fund have not seemed to improve the organizations’ 
eﬀectiveness of lending to low-income countries despite ongoing eﬀorts to improve cooperation (Birdsall 
and Kapur et al. 2005, 1). Instead, such overlap has enhanced operational complexity and, from 
the recipient’s point of view, possibly added to confusion. Since it is not clear that the Fund has any 
comparative advantage regarding structural, sectoral, and microeconomic matters, there is no strong case 
for it to be engaged in these lending operations.71 There is a greater case, though, for a scaling back of 
Fund activities to focus on its core responsibilities. As Steven Radelet says, “[t]he more the IMF moves in 
the direction of becoming a development agency (or a quasi substitute for an independent central bank) 
the further it strays from its core responsibilities articulated in the Articles of Agreement” (Radelet 2006, 
402). As such, the Fund needs to step back and let other existing organizations handle these areas.
From an operational point of view, working with recipients close enough to help them develop 
governance structures and to foster ownership entails certain requirements: The organization needs to 
have staﬀ, including senior staﬀ, present in capitals through resident missions. These staﬀ members not 
only need to possess a broad range of relevant expertise across various disciplines but also need to have 
a prominent role within internal processes rather than serve merely as a spokesperson for headquarters. 
Furthermore, analytical frameworks that consider factors of governance need to be employed. Given 
the evidence of the study and subsequent initiatives related to enhancing country ownership, the Bank 
has moved substantially further in the direction of these requirements than the Fund, making it better 
positioned to work closely with recipient governments and incorporate their priorities into policy 
recommendations.72
Rather than moving in this direction, the Fund should remain focused on the policy parameters 
within its core area of responsibility or run the risk of losing some of its operational strengths, namely 
the ability to operate rapidly in crisis situations. As Truman describes (2006a, 35), there is an imbalance 
71.  As Truman (2006a, 26) describes, such “mission creep” is seen by some as being driven by diﬀerent reasons: The changing 
needs of member governments, the eﬀort of the Fund itself to expand the organization’s inﬂuence, or by the push of particularly
powerful members. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence collected during the course of the empirical research suggests that the 
Fund’s move into structural issues was partly driven by the fact that the Bank sometimes did not deliver the required input in 
time to comply with the Fund’s deadlines. Whatever the reason, there is little in the organization’s Articles of Agreement to 
support this expansion.
72.  Nevertheless, as noted by Birdsall and Kapur et al. (2005, 14), the Bank still has a long way to go and further eﬀorts need to 
be made to fully adjust their advice and conditions to the speciﬁcities of individual countries.58
between the Fund’s ambition regarding its goals and being stretched in resources. The Fund should 
maintain full authority on policy variables that fall within areas of macroeconomic and ﬁnancial 
sectors; for other variables, the Fund should have to rely on the Bank. Rather than conducting its own 
macroeconomic analysis and developing its own conditions, the Bank would need to rely on the Fund. 
Such a proposal is in line with one presented by Radelet (2006, 406) in which he recommends that 
instead of the Bank carrying out its own macroeconomic analyses for its Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) system, the Bank should rely on the Fund’s assessments of macroeconomic policies 
in general, and ﬁscal, debt, ﬁnancial sector, and possibly trade policies, in particular. Consistency 
between the two organizations could be achieved if each organization had the authority to approve policy 
parameters that fall within its area of responsibility (i.e., the Fund would need to provide and approve 
macroeconomic conditions; the Bank would approve conditions that relate to developmental goals and 
priorities). Such a proposal would also support a shift in operations for the PRGF from the Fund to the 
Bank, as proposed by others (Truman 2006a, 26–27). Such a move would be justiﬁed by the fact that 
the PRGF’s lending to low-income countries increasingly falls outside the Fund’s short-term jurisdiction 
to ﬁnance balance of payments and exchange rate problems and more within the Bank’s longer-term 
development mandate. 
Adhering to this proposal would reduce overlap between the two organizations. Both organizations 
could reduce the amount of resources allocated to matters outside their core areas of responsibility. New 
resources would become available for each organization to develop mechanisms for providing a “seal of 
approval” on a speciﬁc country’s development strategy (Bank) or macroeconomic framework (Fund) 
regardless of the extent to which the Bank or the Fund are involved in operations that provide ﬁnancial 
support to that country. Such services are particularly relevant in light of new modalities emerging for the 
Fund and the Bank in terms of monitoring and signaling the strength of macroeconomic policies without 
direct ﬁnancial involvement—in the form of “unfunded programs” or other “policy support mechanisms” 
(Birdsall and Kapur et al. 2005, 17). Such a shift has been generated by the resolution (for the most part) 
of the macroeconomic crises that plagued many low-income countries in the 1980s and early 1990s 
which means that the IMF’s ﬁnancial role is likely to diminish over time. As a result, resource allocation 
and analytic work would become less tied to ﬁnancial operations than it has been in the past. 
Implementing the present proposal would entail a scaling back of Fund operations to only its core 
responsibilities for developing policy recommendations and developing conditions, in line with Timothy 
Adams (2006, 133–34) by saying that “the best way to strengthen the IMF’s relevance is to refocus on 
the core mission. . .international ﬁnancial stability and balance of payments adjustment.” If this proposal 
was implemented, the Fund should only be involved in building institutions and those areas that relate 
directly to its core area of responsibility (i.e, macro and ﬁnancial sectors) but not beyond.73 Both the Fund 
and the Bank would increasingly serve as a brain trust in complementary areas, namely development 
73. Such a proposal then runs counter to the recommendation put forth in the September 2005 reports of IMF governors and 
members of the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) that the Fund should support more expansive vision 
of the Fund’s role in low-income countries and involvement in building institutions and capacity in low-income countries. As 
Truman notes, the “IMF members may under appreciate the implications of this suggestion” (Truman 2006b, 5).59
(Bank) and macro/ﬁnancial sectors (Fund).74 Still, the Fund should move toward hiring staﬀ with a 
broader skill set, including more expertise in political economy and country experience as suggested by 
Kahler (2006, 266). However, such expertise would be used for the Fund’s core area, and it would not be 
used not to develop expertise or deﬁne policy conditions in areas outside its core responsibilities. In cases 
that go beyond the Fund’s core areas in its own lending operations, it should rely on the Bank’s input.
Summary
Given the shifting priorities of the international policy-lending environment, current mechanisms for 
ensuring consistency may become less relevant to ensuring sound policy recommendations. This section 
presents two complementary proposals for altering Bank and Fund operations to ensure the best possible 
policy advice and outcomes for its members. In some cases, these proposals could entail redundant 
operations between the Bank and the Fund and/or between one of the organizations and the borrowing 
government or expert groups. Redundant operations contrast the principles of division of labor and 
complementarity which have traditionally guided Bank-Fund cooperation. Yet in light of the recent 
evidence of policy errors, redundancy provides another avenue that, under speciﬁc situations, can both 
reduce the risk of errors and engage borrowing countries more eﬀectively in the process of designing 
lending agreements. Both in terms of transferring technical capacity to borrowing governments and 
fostering greater ownership, redundancy represents a mechanism largely employed in the private sector 
to improve performance that has yet to be exploited by the Bretton Woods sisters. Such an approach is 
particularly geared towards reducing the risk of error in policy advice in cases where such errors would be 
extremely costly.
In other cases, like those where the organizations do not share expertise and where the risk of 
oversight (or rather failure to fully consider country-speciﬁc factors and input) is a more central factor to 
the success of lending operations, the Bank and the Fund should further strengthen their division of labor. 
This shift should emphasize the Bank’s responsibility in policy areas related to development, particularly 
in relation to developing countries, with the Fund scaling back its operations.
74. How the two organizations should develop their role of signaling goes beyond the scope of this work; however as Birdsall 
and Kapur et al. (2005, 18) propose, the Bank should agree (together with the IMF and other donors and creditors) on the 
role it should play in signaling the adequacy of a country’s “development” approach to complement the IMF’s macroeconomic 
signaling.60
V.  CONCLUSION
The proposals presented in the previous section underscore some of the key issues framing the debate 
about reforming the Bretton Woods organizations. At the heart of the IMF reform debate is the 
very relevance of the organization to its members (Truman 2006a, 3). Similarly for its sister, Birdsall 
and Kapur et al. (2005, 2) point out that, “the Bank is under pressure, its legitimacy, credibility, its 
eﬀectiveness, and its fundamental mission are all in question.” Though calls for reform are numerous, 
speciﬁc proposals are less common. A key lesson drawn from the present study is that the relevance of the 
two organizations may be enhanced by addressing an age old issue, namely cooperation between the two. 
Despite eﬀorts by the Bank and the Fund to cooperate and speak with one voice, we have seen the two 
sisters at times bickering, stepping on each other’s toes, and giving each other the silent treatment. Their 
relationship remains complex.
The two organizations’ typical approach to get along better has been to further delineate 
responsibilities between them. Yet this recipe too has had a long and mixed history. A treatment of known 
operational factors that inﬂuence how the organizations work internally, with their member countries 
and with one another, has been largely missing from the reform discussion. Therefore, the study that 
examines when and why the Bretton Woods sisters cooperate presented in this working paper attempts 
to contribute to the reform debate in a new way. Namely, it hopes to add value to the current discussion 
by regarding matters from a more strictly operational perspective, grounded in empirical evidence. 
The concluding sections, then, highlight some of the key questions emerging from the debate on Bank 
and Fund reform and draw from the ﬁndings of the study to discuss how the speciﬁc reform proposals 
presented in this working paper may serve to enhance the legitimacy and relevance of the Bretton Woods 
sisters.
Study Revisited
To summarize, the study presented in sections I and II, addresses the impression that despite the Bank’s 
and the Fund’s expressed desire to ensure consistent stances in their policy recommendations, they 
often, but not always, speak with one voice. Drawing on ﬁeld research conducted in four countries, 
the study tests a range of variables in order to explain the circumstances under which the Bank and 
the Fund are consistent. Drawing on this evidence, the variation in Bank-Fund consistency has been 
explained with two variables, i.e., domain consensus and similarity in operational styles. The study ﬁnds 
that whenever the two organizations agreed on the boundaries of each other’s operations (i.e., domain 
consensus) and whenever they operated in similar styles, the Bank and the Fund tended to speak with 
one voice. Conversely, the combination of domain dissent and diﬀerent operational styles are associated 
with inconsistency in the stances the Bank and the Fund took vis-à-vis borrowing governments. With 
very few exceptions, all observations of the four country case studies can be explained by these variables. 
To the extent that both variables are endogenous to the Bank’s and the Fund’s management, it lies 61
within the power of the two organizations whether or not the operations of the two organizations are 
consistent. The ﬁndings are in line with recent attempts of the Bank and the Fund to understand how 
the two organizations work together, like the 2004 survey conducted among Bank and Fund staﬀ and 
national authorities mentioned in the introduction (IMF and World Bank 2004). Yet the value-added 
of the present study is to go beyond anecdotal and potentially biased data to hone in on the drivers of 
consistency and inconsistency. The variables employed and analytical methodology provide a point of 
departure not only for future research on the relationship between the Bretton Woods sisters but may also 
on insights for studying the interaction and relationships between other international organizations.
Against the study’s ﬁndings, the other sections provide an evaluation of the measures the Bank and 
the Fund have taken in recent years to ensure Bank-Fund cooperation. In many ways, these measures can 
be expected to be eﬀective. For example, by introducing formal procedures of sharing information, they 
have signiﬁcantly reduced levels of ambiguity and facilitated the exchange of information. Furthermore 
some measures have allowed the two organizations to coordinate their operations on a country-speciﬁc 
level helping overcome, to some degree, the diﬀerences in operational styles. 
However, despite these advantages, signiﬁcant challenges remain. For instance, the lack of internal 
staﬀ incentives for enhanced communication is likely to undermine formal agreements and mechanisms 
of cooperation. Also, the changing environment of policy lending, particularly its emphasis on country 
speciﬁcity and ownership, has added new challenges not only for ensuring Bank-Fund consistency but 
also in terms of ensuring that the Bretton Woods organizations can deliver the best policy advice to 
borrowing governments. The Bank seems to have adapted better and faster to such requirements through 
an more decentralized and ﬂexible operational model than the Fund. As a result, the Bank may be better 
positioned to lead in policy lending in all but a few matters related strictly to macroeconomic policy 
reforms. 
An important implication emerging from the study is that Bank-Fund consistency may not 
always be desirable. Based on the theory of bounded rationality as well as on empirical evidence, the 
organizations run the risk of committing errors in their policy advice to borrowing countries. Such errors 
in the context of public crises have contributed to undermining the organizations’ legitimacy. Therefore, 
the organizations need to address how to reduce the risk of errors and ensure that they can deliver the best 
policy advice possible. The proposals presented in section IV, namely the introduction of redundancy in 
some high-stake matters and greater strengthening of the Bank’s role in others, both contribute to this aim 
and resonate well with trends in the current debate over reform. In particular, the proposals oﬀered here 
are similar to trends that highlight a scaling back of Fund lending operations particularly with low-income 
members, outline a more prominent role of the Bank with ownership promotion and country-tailored 
lending arrangements, and advocate a greater role of both organizations in providing technical assistance 
and signalling through unfunded programs in their respective areas of expertise.62
Merry Sisterhood?
Whether the future relationship between the Fund and the Bank is merry or guarded will depend 
largely on the path of reform measures taken within the two organizations. Much of the reform debate 
focuses on issues of governance to enhance their legitimacy. Yet the study and discussion presented in 
this working paper shows that operational changes, particularly regarding cooperation between the two, 
are also important to enhance the eﬀectiveness and relevance of the organizations. In fact, the country 
research demonstrates that as the two organizations grow, it is within their own ability to determine how 
consistent they will be on the advice they give to others. The study also shows that, as in any relationship, 
agreeing with one another may not always provide the optimal outcome. Appropriately channelled 
disagreements between the Bank and the Fund, like those that come from redundant operations, may 
provide the two sisters with the opportunity to mature and learn from one another, while enhancing 
their individual eﬀectiveness and therefore strengthening their legitimacy with member governments. 
Furthermore, mechanisms and incentives that incorporate the analysis of one organization into the 
operations of the other, as proposed by Radelet (2006, 406), may be just what the Bank and the Fund 
need to build a relationship based on healthy interdependence and mutual respect. 
As the Bretton Woods sisters grow, any changes to their interactions with their members or with 
each other are likely to incur costs. However, the costs of not changing are high as well. In light of 
publicized policy mistakes and greater access to capital markets for member governments, the Bank and 
the Fund ﬁnd themselves less sought out and less relevant. Yet the two sisters play an important role. As 
public organizations managing the global economy, they have the mandate to minimize externalities and 
correct market failures while promoting economic stability, more equitable growth, and a reduction in 
global poverty. Without adjusting their operations, including changing the way they interact and work 
together, the Bank and the Fund will continue to lose ground. This study hopes to contribute to this 
debate and stimulate further discussion and future empirical research on the relationship between the 
Bretton Woods sisters, so that they not only better their relationship but also strengthen themselves in 
the process. 63
  APPENDIX A 
Table A.1    Overview of variables and indicators
Variable Acronym Event Code Indicators of measurement/
guiding questions
Dependent variable
Bank-Fund cooperation C Communication between IMF and 
World Bank falls short of ensuring the 
consistency of their operations.
0 Is the communication betweeen 
the two organizations suﬃcient 
to ensure the consistency of their 
operations?
Suﬃcient communication between 
IMF and World Bank to ensure the 




Similarity of operational 
styles
O The operational styles are diﬀerent. 0 1. Similarity in degree of staﬀ 
turnover
The operational styles are similar. 1 2. Similarity in degree of 
intraorganizational 
consistency 
3. Similarity in operational 
speed
Similarity of resident 
mission arrangements
M The two organizations have diﬀerent 
arrangements for most of the episode.
0 Dates when resident missions
were opened or closed.
The Bank and the Fund have the same 
arrangement for most of the episode.
1
Personal  friction between 
senior staﬀs
P There is evidence that personal 
friction impeded the communication 
between the two organizations.
0 Do interviews provide 
evidence of personal friction?
There is no evidence of personal 
friction impeding the  communication 
between the two organizations.
1
Domain consensus
Domain consensus D There is domain dissent between the 
two organizations.
0 Is there any evidence of staﬀ 
members of one organization 
disapproving of the boundaries 
of the other organization’s 
activities?
There is domain consensus between 
the two organizations.
1
Formal agreement of 
cooperation on operational 
level
A There is no agreement in place. 0 Was there a Policy Framework
 Paper (or a similar arrangement) 
in place in this episode?
There is an agreement of place. 1
(table continues next page)64
Table A.1    Overview of variables and indicators (continued)
Variable Acronym Event Code Indicators of measurement/
guiding questions
Similarity in each 
organization’s exposure 
to the recipient country
I The country is of diﬀerent operational 
importance to each organization.
0 Proxy variable: the ratio of the 
Bank’s disbursements to the 
Fund’s disbursements. In 
addition, evidence of analytic
 work, allocation of resources, 
and attention from senior 
management is taken into 
account.
The country is of similar operational 
importance to each organization.
1
Sense of economic crisis S The government, the IMF, and the 
World Bank have diﬀerent views on 
policy priorities.
0 Was there an urgent need to 
take speciﬁc policy measures?
The government, the IMF, and the 
World Bank agree on which measures 
are to be taken.
1
Ambiguity of comparative 
advantage
U There is no consensus on which 
organization would be best prepared 
to address the speciﬁc issue.
0 Was one organization 
perceived to have a 
comparative advantage?
The IMF, World Bank, and the 
government agree on which 
organization is best prepared to 





N The country’s negotiating position 
is weak.
0 1. Urgency of an agreement
The country’s negotiating position 
is strong.




T The government is technically weak. 0 1. Evidence of the government 
presenting its own policy 
proposals
The government is technically strong. 1 2. Signiﬁcant participation of 
(former) staﬀ members in the 
government’s  decision making




R The two organizations have a
diﬀerent relationship with the 
recipient country.
0 1. Compliance with the 
principles of diplomacy and 
technicality
The two organizations have a similar 
relationship with the recipient 
country.
1 2. Personal views of government 
oﬃcials and staﬀ members
Extent of disagreement 
between government and 
Bank/Fund
G The views of the IMF and the 
World Bank are not contrary to the 
government’s view.
0 Is there evidence of a general 
disagreement betweeen the 
government and the two
Bretton Woods organizations?
The views of both the IMF and the 




METHOD OF ANALYSIS: BOOLEAN ALGEBRA
The method of Boolean algebra allows us to isolate those conditions (or the combinations of conditions) 
which are necessary or suﬃcient to ﬁnd the IMF and the World Bank cooperating (Wickham-Crowley 
1991, 87). The method of Boolean algebra was chosen over other methods of analysis for several reasons 
which make it well-suited for the nature of this study. First, in contrast to standard statistical methods, 
Boolean algebra oﬀers a high degree of speciﬁcity as it allows researchers to interpret the method’s 
outcomes in the light of speciﬁc observations. Therefore, this method provides a framework to combine 
quantitative, narrative analysis with contextual narratives. Additionally sensitivity to combinations 
of diﬀerent conditions rather than having diﬀerent variables compete with each other distinguishes 
this method from standard statistical methods.1 As speciﬁc variables are allowed to remain inherently 
dependent on the presence or absence of others for their eﬀects, this method allows conditions to remain 
contextualized. Third this method allows one to transform a high level of complexity encountered in the 
initial stage of the research process into parsimonious explanations of speciﬁc outcomes (Ragin 1987, 
122).
Before describing the speciﬁc steps of the analysis, it is important to highlight a key distinction 
between two methods of comparative analysis on which Boolean algebra is based: the indirect method 
of diﬀerence and the method of agreement. In the former method, one considers observations which 
have diﬀerent ﬁnal outcomes but are otherwise quite similar in terms of other observed conditions. One 
interprets those diﬀering conditions as the drivers of the two observations’ diﬀerent  outcomes. In the 
latter method, observations showing similar outcomes but multiple diﬀering conditions are considered. 
Those conditions which are similar between the observations are inferred to be the cause of their similar 
outcomes (Wickham-Crowley 1991, 85–86).2
Based on this approach, the analysis using Boolean algebra starts by identifying the presence or 
absence of the outcome that is to be studied (i.e., consistent policy stances of the Bank and Fund) as well 
as the presence or absence of the conditions hypothesized to explain this outcome (i.e., domain consensus, 
ambiguous comparative advantage between the two organizations, etc.). Both the set of conditions and 
the outcome are expressed as binary variables, which is ﬁtting given the highly qualitative nature of 
the variables this study employs. Using a truth table, the combinations of variables associated with the 
presence and the absence of the outcome in question are identiﬁed. 
Applying simple algebraic rules, this analysis follows a series of steps. In the ﬁrst step, the 
combinations (called Boolean expressions) that are associated with the presence of the dependent variable 
are listed. These lists are then simpliﬁed according to a set of rules which help reduce the complexity 
1. However, statistical methods can test for combinations of variables by including interaction terms, a technique that entails a 
signiﬁcant loss of degrees of freedom.
2. This distinction was ﬁrst made by John Stuart Mill and so is referred to as Millian logic (Wickham-Crowley 1991, 85–86). 
The Millian logic has been translated by Charles Ragin (1987) into Boolean algebra.66
of diﬀerent combinations of variables.3 The analysis generates a ﬁnal statement which identiﬁes the 
conditions under which the positive outcome of the dependent variable has been found. Once the 
conditions of the speciﬁc outcome are deﬁned one can derive the combinations of conditions of the 
absent outcome.
One important methodological question relates to the way the variables have been measured on 
the basis of qualitative information for the study presented in this working paper. The highly qualitative 
nature of the information and the diversity of phenomena across observations do not allow us to measure 
the variables across countries and episodes on the basis of strictly deﬁned criteria as meanings of speciﬁc 
phenomena vary in diﬀerent contexts (Blalock 1982, 66). Therefore, the value assigned to the episode or 
the issue in question is a product of a combination of factual information and judgment.4
There are some potential problems associated with employing Boolean algebra as a method of 
analysis, but Ragin has proposed speciﬁc techniques to deal with these problems. For example, the same 
combinations of explanatory variables may be associated with diﬀerent values of the outcome that is 
to be explained. One strategy to deal with this problem consists of examining the troublesome cases in 
greater detail and attempting to identify omitted causal variables (Ragin 1987, 113–21). Another possible 
problem relates to the high number of combinations (in this case for cooperation and noncooperation) 
given the number of explanatory variables. For instance, there are not less than 512 possible combinations 
for cooperation and noncooperation given nine explanatory variables deﬁned for each episode. This 
number is far higher than the numbers of diﬀerent episodes we can expect to derive from the four country 
cases. Ragin (1987) proposes four speciﬁc ways to deal with this: First variables showing high or perfect 
correlation can be pooled without signiﬁcant loss of information. Second variables showing no or very 
little variation can be dropped. Third, simplifying assumptions can account for the combinations for 
which no observations have been available (Ragin 1987, 106). Fourth a variable can be created to serve 
as a simple presence/absence dichotomy indicating whether or not a certain combination of causes exists. 
Through Boolean algebra, this variable can be transformed in a statement of combinations of variables 
which do not exist and used to simplify the analysis (Ragin 1987, 109). 
3. For example, one of these rules says that if two Boolean expressions diﬀer in only one causal condition yet produce the same 
outcome, then the causal condition that distinguishes the two expressions can be considered irrelevant. Removing this condition
then yields a simpler expression (Ragin 1987, 93).
4. To ensure that measurement of each of the variables is veriﬁable the country narratives presented in Fabricius (1999) contain
the factual information as well as the interpretation that has led variables to be coded in a speciﬁc way.67
APPENDIX C 
EXAMPLE OF CODINGTHE COUNTRY EVIDENCE: PAKISTANI EPISODE
OF BUREAUCRATIC RULE 198083
Throughout this episode, Pakistan was under the military dictatorship of General Zia who came to power 
after the political coup he had launched in 1977. 5 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 
and the Islamic revolution in Iran strengthened the strategic importance of Pakistan as a pro-Western 
Islamic country and increased the willingness of Western donors to provide aid.
In the face of economic imbalances, triggered largely by the second oil shock in 1979 and ensuing 
inﬂation, the government and IMF staﬀ started discussions on a three-year economic program. In 
November 1980, the Fund’s Board approved a program under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) in the 
amount of SDR 1268, equivalent to 445 percent of Pakistan’s quota. This loan was to be disbursed in 
three tranches. While this program addressed a broad agenda of policy measures on the demand- and the 
supply-side of the economy, the government was primarily interested in balance of payments support. 
 As for the World Bank’s operations, in 1982, its Board approved a Structural Adjustment Loan 
(SAL). Following two years of preparations, this loan was based on various sectoral studies. This loan 
spelled out measures in development planning as well as various measures in agricultural/water sector 
policies, energy sector policies, and industrial sector policies. In all three sectors, the loan aimed at 
reducing price distortions. The loan was structured to be disbursed in two tranches with the second 
tranche scheduled for disbursement in September 1983. 
As for the physical setting of their operations, the Bank and the Fund operated under very diﬀerent 
conditions. Whereas the Fund usually dealt with the Karachi-based State Bank of Pakistan, the Bank 
often dealt with the Planning Commission and various line ministries. Both organizations had had long-
standing relationships with the Ministry of Finance. Among the government’s core agencies, the Fund has 
often enjoyed better access to both senior oﬃcials and statistical data, which had often been envied by the 
Bank’s staﬀ. Since the 1960s the Bank had a (fairly small) resident mission in Islamabad. It was only in 
1991 that the Fund was permitted to open a resident mission in Islamabad. Therefore, the variable called
similarity of resident mission arrangement” is coded as zero, as shown in table 4.
 One of the variables hypothesized to aﬀect Bank-Fund cooperation is the similarity in the 
borrowing country’s operational importance to each of the two organizations. The borrowing country’s 
operational importance is approximated by the ratio of the two organizations’ disbursements to each 
other. Both organizations made disbursements in each year of this episode.Whereas the Fund disbursed 
about three times the amount the Bank disbursed, both organizations had ongoing lending operations in 
the country. This observation allows us to conclude that Pakistan was of similar operational importance to 
both organizations. Therefore, as shown in table 4, the variable called similarity of country’s operational 
importance to each organization is coded as one. 
5. Abridged from chapter 5, section 2 of Fabricius (1999, 321–41).68
Throughout this episode, the Bank and the Fund adhered to some division of labor: Whereas the 
Fund addressed macroeconomic issues, the Bank conﬁned itself to sectoral matters. On macroeconomic 
issues, the Bank explicitly deferred to the Fund.These issues included the deﬁnition and monitoring of 
ﬁscal ceilings, monetary policy, exchange rate policy, measures of export promotion (which included 
ﬂexible exchange rate policies), and the government’s program of import liberalization. The Bank’s refrain 
from addressing macroeconomic issues not only corresponded to its sectoral expertise, but also resulted 
from the Bank’s acquiescence to the Pakistani request to focus on sectoral issues. 
Despite this general division of labor, some policy issues were addressed by both the Bank and 
the Fund. In some areas, the two organizations focused on the same aspects. In the area of privatization, 
for example, both the Fund and the Bank urged the government to prepare a list of the industrial units 
the governments was to divest. In other areas, each of the two organizations concentrated on diﬀerent 
aspects. In the area of ﬁscal policy, for example, the Fund deﬁned the program targets and addressed 
aspects related to the tax system, whereas the Bank, by contrast, focused on the expenditure side. As for 
fertilizers, the Fund focused on reducing the demand by increasing the prices of fertilizers, whereas the 
Bank advocated measures to increase supply.
For this episode, there is no evidence of any inconsistency between the operations of the Bank and 
the Fund. According to interviewees, speciﬁc measures’ importance diﬀered to the two organizations. 
Whereas the Bank emphasized sectoral issues, these issues seemed to be of marginal importance to the 
Fund. According to one government oﬃcial, slippage on structural issues alone would not have led the 
Fund to suspend its program. Given the consistency between the Bank and the Fund, the variable called 
cooperation is coded as one, as shown in table 4.
The consistency in the Bank’s and the Fund’s operations can be explained by various modes of 
communication between the Bank and the Fund staﬀs.  The staﬀs of the two organizations seemed to 
share information and seek agreement on issues that interested both organizations. However, there is no 
evidence of any regular patterns of documents being shared on a consistent basis. Moreover, there was 
no agreement in place with respect to which the staﬀs of the two organizations should have cooperated. 
Therefore, the variable called formal agreement of cooperation on the operational level is coded as 
zero. Moreover, there is no evidence of any personal friction between the Bank’s and the Fund’s staﬀs. 
Therefore, the variable called personal friction between senior staﬀs is coded as one. The ﬁndings of this 
episode are similar to the ﬁndings for every other episode of Pakistan. 
According to interviewees, this episode witnessed neither joint nor augmented missions. 
Furthermore, there were no trilateral meetings. Despite the lack of any visible regular patterns of 
communication, one senior government oﬃcial pointed out that “it seemed that they [the staﬀs of the 
Bank and the Fund] were coordinating all the time.”
 What may explain the communication between the Bank and the Fund is the similarity in their 
operational styles measured in terms of three indicators, i.e., the similarity of staﬀ turnover, similarity 
of intraorganizational consistency, and similar operational speed. There is no evidence of diﬀerent 
operational styles for any of these indicators. Therefore, the corresponding variable is coded as one. 69
The government’s negotiating position is measured by two factors, i.e., the government’s urgency of 
reaching an agreement and the government’s bargaining capacity. Two factors determining the borrowing 
government’s urgency of an agreement is the situation of the economy and the government’s political 
situation. As for the situation of the economy, high levels of export earnings and remittances left the 
government in a comfortable position vis-à-vis the Bretton Woods organizations. Concerning the urgency 
of an agreement, the government’s position also beneﬁted from the increasing volume of aid provided 
by Western governments. As these capital inﬂows were independent from the government’s compliance 
with the IMF program, they left the government in a comfortable position vis-à-vis the Bretton Woods 
organizations.
 Concerning its political situation, the government enjoyed a high level of political autonomy 
during the ﬁrst two years of the program period. Given the repressive nature of the political system, the 
government had a high level of discretion. One senior government oﬃcial pointed out that during this 
episode, the government could issue presidential orders and implement laws within one day. However, 
characterizing the government’s position as being unconstrained would be somewhat misleading. Despite 
the absence of any parliamentary opposition, the government’s room for maneuver was constrained by 
the need to safeguard the loyalty of strong vested interests. Thanks to the comfortable external position of 
the economy, compliance with the Fund’s and the Bank’s programs became a second priority. There was 
no urgent need for a program with the Bank and the Fund. Hence, the ﬁrst indicator suggests that the 
government’s negotiating position was strong. 
The government’s negotiating position was strong not only because of its independence from 
subsequent disbursements from the Bretton Woods organizations, but also because of its bargaining 
capacity. Under the strong leadership of Finance Minister Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the government had a 
strong capacity to develop its own views. 
The government not only developed its own view, but also pursued its interests eﬀectively in the 
course of program negotiations. By various accounts, the government’s negotiations with the Bank and 
the Fund followed clearly deﬁned procedures. Thanks to their seniority, various government oﬃcials 
had considerable familiarity with the Fund and the Bank. Government oﬃcials usually supported their 
arguments with economic data, data that were sometimes more detailed than the data available to the 
Fund. By several accounts, the government’s high level of preparedness was one of the reasons why it was 
capable of eﬀectively pursuing its interests in negotiations with the Fund and the Bank. Furthermore, the 
government’s bargaining capacity beneﬁted from the high degree of autonomy the Ministry of Finance 
enjoyed vis-à-vis the political leadership. Not only domestically, but also internationally did the minister 
of ﬁnance enjoy access to key decision makers. As the minister of ﬁnance served as chairman of the 
Bank-Fund Development Committee, he was highly regarded and quite familiar with the procedures of 
the two Bretton Woods organizations. In particular, the ﬁnance minister’s relationship with the Fund’s 
Managing Director has often been characterized as excellent.What is important in the context of this 
study is that the minister of ﬁnance was very skillful in using his standing—both domestically and 
internationally—to broaden the government’s room for maneuver vis-à-vis the Bank and the Fund. For 70
instance, by several accounts, the Fund’s Managing Director repeatedly softened the conditions the Fund’s 
staﬀ had negotiated with the government in response to diplomatic initiatives by the ﬁnance minister.
What this suggests is that by both indicators, the government’s negotiating position was strong. Therefore, 
the variable called negotiating position is coded as one. 
As for the government’s relationship with the two Bretton Woods organizations, public statements 
suggest that the government’s oﬃcial relationship with both the Bank and the Fund was reasonably good. 
There is no evidence of any violation of the principles of diplomacy and technicality. The government 
referred to its program with the Fund as corresponding to the government’s own policy priorities.
Government oﬃcials pointed out that, in general, the attitude of the Bank and the Fund vis-à-vis Pakistan 
was “always sympathetic” in the course of this episode.
However, further evidence suggests that the government’s relationship with the Fund was more 
adversarial than its relationship with the Bank. To a large part, this can be attributed to disagreements 
related to the Fund’s conditionality, in particular, with respect to the government’s ﬁscal policy. What was 
particularly contentious was the Fund’s requirement that the government introduce an eﬀective sales tax. 
By various accounts, the government and the staﬀ of the Fund failed to reconcile their views on the sales 
tax: The Fund did not accept the government’s argument that due to weak institutions, taxes like the sales 
tax could not be levied in Pakistan. Further controversies resulted from the government’s reluctance to cut 
subsidies to fertilizers and wheat. 
Against this background, it is not surprising that the government’s relationship with the Fund’s 
staﬀ became quite confrontational. Government oﬃcials remembered Fund oﬃcials as “very strict.” 
Discussions have been described as “very hard” and the extent of arguing “very strong.” The contentious 
character of this relationship may account for the government’s attempt to tightly control the Fund’s 
access to its ministries: When the Fund wanted to open a resident mission in Islamabad, the government 
declined.
By many accounts, the government’s relationship with the World Bank was more relaxed than 
was its relationship with the Fund. One senior oﬃcial characterized the government’s relationship with 
the Bank as “more outgoing, open, and friendly” than its relationship with the Fund. Many government 
oﬃcials described their relationship with the staﬀ of the Bank’s resident mission as “very good.” 
Government oﬃcials also pointed out that the government usually had more room to get its way in 
negotiations with the Bank than with the Fund. They attributed this not only to the Bank’s interest in 
continuing its lending operations, but also to what they described as the lower degree of preparedness of 
Bank missions in comparison with Fund missions. One oﬃcial pointed out that “sometimes, people in 
the Bank who came on missions had hardly done their homework.” What the evidence suggests is that 
the government’s relationship with the Bank was signiﬁcantly less adversarial than its relationship with the 
Fund. The corresponding variable is coded as zero.
Based on the interpretation above, table 4 presents the variables as they have been measured for 
the episode of bureaucratic rule. As shown in the column entitled “C,” the Bank and the Fund have been 
found to cooperate in this episode. Five explanatory variables show the value which has been hypothesized 71
to be conducive to Bank-Fund cooperation. The episode of bureaucratic rule suggests that the cooperation 
between the Bank and the Fund may be explained by the absence of personal friction (P), the similarity in 
Pakistan’s operational importance to each of the two organizations (I), similar operational styles (O), the 
absence of domain dissent (D), or the government’s strong negotiating position (N).72
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